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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
Basic to the operation of all business organizations is the practice 
of evaluating performance. The degree of formality used in performing 
the evaluation as well as the scope of the evaluation may vary between 
settings. Likewise, the method employed to facilitate the evaluation 
and the factor(s) upon which the evaluation is conducted may also vary. 
Though organizations differ on the various facets of evaluating perform-
ance, there remains the need for performance evaluation (PE). 
The Need for Performance Evaluation 
Performance evaluation has been employed in all types of settings 
and through many different methods. The objectives that traditional 
management theory suggests may be accomplished through the use of PE 
commonly include attainment of organizational goals, examination of 
the potential for growth and advancement, maintenance of organization 
effectiveness and prediction of future performance (Miner, 1968; DeNisi 
and Mitchell, 1978; Beer, Ruh, Dawson and. Kavanagh, 1978; Latham, Fay 
and Saari, 1979). 
More recently developed organizational theories continue to 
indicate a need for an evaluation of performance. Agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) suggests that in any employer-employee 
relationship between two individuals, performance evaluation of some 
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type is necessary to enable the employer to influence the employee to 
function in the manner desired. This need is based upon the commonly 
accepted assumption that employees will perform so as to maximize their 
own self interest (benefit). The purpose of PE as used by the employer 
is to help align the activities which maximize the employee's self 
interest with those activities which maximize the employer's_self 
interest. 
This alignment of interests is accomplished by making the attain-
ment of rewards by each employee contingent upon performance desired 
by the employer. The rewards available are both qualitative and 
quantitative in nature. Qualitative rewards include such things as 
praise, acceptance, acknowledgment and job security. Quantitative 
rewards include regular pay, benefits, bonuses, profit sharing 
revenues and gifts. In many if not most cases, rewards are of both a 
qualitative and quantitative nature. The "Employee of the ·Month" award 
is a tangible (quantitative) reward while it serves to indicate 
acceptance and praise (qualitative). Position advances include 
increases in pay and benefits (quantitative) as well as added prestige, 
job security and acceptance (qualitative). 
The employer makes these rewards contingent upon performance by the 
employee which is of most benefit to the employer (Demski, 1972). 
Various factors or attributes are used as periodic measures of the 
extent to which the desired benefit maximization occurs. As with the 
employee's rewards, these factors are also qualitative and quantitative 
in nature. Qualitative factors include such things as company reputa-
tion, social and community acceptance, employee morale and capability. 
Quantitative factors include profit, market share, product development 
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and financial stability. As with the employee's rewards, many if not 
all of the attributes used by the employer are both qualitative and 
quantitative in nature. Maintaining a quality product indicates 
maintenance of the qualitative attribute of company reputation as well 
as the quantitative attribute of sales volume. Low employee turnover 
usually indicates good employee morale (qualitative) as well as low 
·, 
training costs and consistent production (quantitative). 
Thus, the employer desires performance by the employee which may 
be measured in terms of both qualitative and quantitative factors and 
may be encouraged through qualitative and quantitative rewards. The 
difficulty that has developed over time is in the selection of a PE 
system that will provide the incentive for employee behavior to 
maximize the employer's benefits. 
Nature of the Problem 
Prior to the industrial revolution, almost all employee-employer 
relationships were on a personal, one to one basis. Workers directly 
and personally interacted with their masters. Performance evaluations 
were very informal in structure, but very individualized and frequent 
and immediate in nature. Rewards ranged from bondage for unacceptable 
service to personal honor, status and wealth for favorable service. 
As industrialization developed, employee-employer relationships 
moved to a more formal, yet still generally personal basis. The 
apprentice (employee) served and worked with the master craftsman 
(employer). The arrangement included a teacher-student as well as an 
employee-employer relationship. Performance evaluation was made on a 
continuing basis and in an individual and personal manner. Unacceptable 
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performance often resulted in dismissal or expulsion from the caste, 
deprival of physical comforts or monetary payments. Acceptable perform-
ance resulted in personal praise and acceptance, monetary rewards, 
acknowledgment within the caste and often partnership in the business. 
As the industrial revoluation progressed, the employee-employer 
relationship became much more formal and distant. Individuals now 
became the employees of a firm, not employees of an individual. The 
personal employee-employer relationship with its individualized 
performance evaluation system was replaced. Scientific management 
(Taylor, 1915) introduced the notion that given sufficient monetary 
incentives, the performance of an individual could be altered to 
accomplish almost any desired task. In essence, with the departure 
from the personal employee-employer relationship, scientific management 
suggested consolidating all qualitative and quantitative rewards 
available to an employee into the single reward of monetary remuneration. 
Not only were the various rewards consolidated into monetary terms, but 
the attributes used to measure performance of employees also tended to 
be consolidated into one quantitative factor. Industrialization 
specialized the task required by each employee. Thus, production 
employees were paid X number of dollars for each time they accomplished 
activity Y. 
Managerial evaluation was also involved in this consolidation. 
Managers are those individuals who link the production employee with 
the employer. In small businesses, the employer (owner) often is also 
the manager who operates the day-to-day affairs of the company. In 
larger concerns, individuals are hired by the employer to oversee the 
daily operation. In the consolidation previously indicated, managers 
typically received monetary remuneration as their reward and the 
maximization of profit was used as the performance measure of interest. 
Many studies have indicated that this type of PE system for managerial 
personnel has not been as effective as predicted because the PE method 
employed failed to control for dysfunctional behavior. For example, 
maximizing profit is typically identified with superior performance. 
However, equally of interest in most" situations is the method by which 
profit is maximized. Control over the methods employed in maximizing 
profit is not available under a single measure system (see Ridgeway, 
1956; Schneider, 1973; Downey, 1974; Mayfield, 1975; and Atkin and 
Conlon, 1978). 
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It is often suggested that a multiple measure performance evalua-
tion system would exhibit more control over dysfunctional behavior. This 
is accomplished by explicitly incorporating factors which limit dysfunc-
tional behavior into the measure by which performance is evaluated. It 
is this suggestion which serves as the basis of this study. This study 
attempts to examine empirically the relative performance of individuals 
in a profit setting evaluated on a single measure approach versus those 
individuals evaluated on a multiple measure approach. The results of 
this empirical testing may be useful in establishing that PE method 
which will best control dysfunctional behavior. 
Scope and Limitations 
This study restricts the issue of evaluating managerial performance 
to a profit making situation. Examination is further restricted to the 
position of a division manager who is in charge of an investment center, 
Extension of this work to include not-for-profit and lower level 
managerial positions is deferred to a subsequent study. 
In this examination, two rewards are present for each and every 
participant. One of the rewards consists of periodic ranking with 
peers (qualitative) while the other is periodic remuneration in dollars 
(quantitative). Remuneration is based on the relative ranking position 
obtained during each period of evaluation. The use of different types 
of rewards (e.g., plaques, trophies, publicity, praise, etc.) as well 
as the use of a different basis by which to assign rewards (e.g., as 
a linear relation to periodic performance, on performance cumulated 
over the experimental period, etc.) might provide the basis for 
additional research. 
Also of a limiting nature is the use of only two different methods 
of evaluating performance. One method uses a periodic profit measure 
of rate of return on initial investment. The other method uses a 
multiple composite of four performance factors; production efficiency, 
market effectiveness, profitability and capacity maintenance. Each of 
the four components of the multiple composite measure are weighted 
equally. The use of other measures of profitability, (e.g., residual 
income, periodic net inco~e, etc.) and/or multiple composite measures 
consisting of alternative components or different weight combinations 
is also deferred.to a subsequent study. 
Other limitations are inherent in the organization of this study. 
In this examination, a simulated business setting is created using a 
computerized business game. College students are used as subjects and 
are asked to make simulated managerial decisions within the business 
game setting. The validity and usefulness of the results and conclu-
sions of this study are based on the degree to which the activities 
in this study reflect those activities found in an actual business 
environment. 
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Summary of Content 
Chapter II examines the current accounting literature on the 
topic of performance evaluation. Studies which examine the use of 
various performance measures are reviewed. Also examined is the 
issue of single versus multiple attribute measures as discussed in 
the accounting literature. 
Chapter III builds a theoretical framework for examining PE. 
Included in this chapter are the theoretical arguments for and against 
the use of the single attribute of prof it as a performance measure and 
those arguments for and against the use of multiple attributes as 
performance measures. The chapter concludes by suggesting specific 
testable hypotheses to be examined by this study. 
Chapter IV and V discuss various issues of using multiple attri-
butes in evaluating performance. Chapter IV focuses on the selection of 
attributes for a multiple measure. Also discussed in this chapter is 
the topic of scaling the selected criteria. Chapter V discusses the 
concept of attribute weighting. Various methods of weighting each 
attribute are discussed on both a practical and theoretical basis. 
Chapter V also presents a decision rule for use in this study. This 
rule is explained, illustrated and compared to alternative methods 
available. Both of these chapters conclude by summarizing the decisions 
and methods discussed in that chapter as employed in this study. 
Chapter VI examines the experimental design and methodology used 
in testing the hypotheses suggested in Chapter III. The nature of the 
business simulation constructed, selection of the subjects, administra-
tion of the experiment and treatment of the experiment results are 
discussed in this chapter. 
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Chapter VII contains an analysis of the study's results. This 
analysis includes general comments about the actions and attitudes 
of the subjects as observed during the experiment as well as both 
graphical and statistical evaluation of experimental results. 
Chapter VIII summarizes Ll1e data derived from the exper lment. 
Conclusions that may be inferred from the study are stated as well 




Previous studies on the use of single measure and multiple 
measure PE systems are examined in this chapter. The major works 
developing arguments for and against each system are discussed. This 
discussion will be followed by a summary and an indication of the 
need for this study. 
Performance Measures 
Single Measure 
In his discussion of the traditional yiew of a firm, Caplan (1971, 
p. 17) states 11 the role of the business manager is to maximize the 
profits of the firm. 11 Such a basic notion has led to measurement of a 
manager's success in terms of the amount of profit accumulated. 
Solomons (1965) in his well known work on measurement and control of 
divisional performance devotes almost all of his discussion to the form 
(accounting net income, return on investment or residual income) of 
profit which should be used for managerial PE. 
To be considered as a meaningful measure of performance it must be 
assumed that maximizing profit incorporates consideration of all of the 
factors necessary to elicit decisions which promote the prosperity and 
survival of the firm in the long run (and hence provide maximum benefit 
to the owner). Whether profit or any other single measure of performance 
9 
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incorporates all factors for long term survival and prosperity is 
questioned in the literature. By only employing one criterion on which 
to measure performance, considerable pressure is placed on the manager 
to optimize that factor. However, when all effort is focused on the 
maximization of a single measure, other factors of importance may be 
ignored. Stated in another way, "Empirical evidence on single measures 
of performance indicates that employees place emphasis on this single 
factor and neglect others important in overall results" (Rosen and 
Schneck, 1967, p. 176). 
Ridgeway (1956) in his discussion of dysfunctional consequences of 
performance measurements cites several examples wherein the use of a 
single measure of performance proved dysfunctional. In one case, 
employment interviewers were appraised by the number of interviews 
conducted. This resulted in the completion of as many interviews as 
possible with inadequate time devoted to finding jobs for the clients. 
The organization's primary function of placing clients in jobs was not 
given primary consideration due to the interviewer's attention to 
interview numbers. 
Many similar results of dysfunctional behavior resulting from the 
use of a single performance measure have been cited in the literature. 
Blau (1955) found the imposition of a quota of eight cases per month for 
investigators in a federal law enforcement agency resulted in the length 
of the case being given priority rather than the urgency of the case as 
impartiality would require. Argyris (1952) found that to meet a quota, 
managers tended to "feed the machines all the easy orders" toward the 
end of the month rather than finish them in the sequence in which they 
were received (see also Granick, 1954; Warren, 1966; Steers, 1975; 
Berliner, 1976; and Vogel, 1981). 
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Multiple Measures 
To compensate for the ineffectiveness of single measures of perform-
ance, the use of multiple measures has been recommended. Theory suggests 
that all desired aspects of performance will thus receive attention and 
emphasis. 
A consensus was reached at a round-table discussion of business 
and professional people,· that although return on investment (profit) is 
important, additional criteria are essential for an adequate performance 
appraisal (Newman and Logan, 1955). Solomons (1965) ends his discussion 
on the use of various profit measures by suggesting that in maximization 
of the long run objective of firm value, there is "plenty of room" for 
other measures of performance. Solomons identifies productivity in 
terms of output per unit of input or input per unit of output and market 
effectiveness in terms of market position as two potentially useful 
measures. Drucker (1954) suggested several measures for PE. These 
measures include: market standing, innovation, productivity, physical 
and financial resources, profitability, manager performance and develop-
ment, worker performance and attitude and public responsibility. Bass 
(1952) carries the multiple measures into the psychological realm by 
suggesting that measures of the value of the firm to the individual and 
the value of the firm and its members to society should also be 
considered. 
Multiple measures are intended to focus attention on the many 
facets of a particular position. Ridgeway (1956) summarizes this 
position as follows: 
The use of multiple criteria assumes that the individual 
will commit his or the organization's efforts, attention 
and resources in greater measure to those activities which 
promise to contribute the greatest improvement to over-all 
performance. There must exist a theoretical condition 
under which an additional unit of effort or resources 
would yield equally desirable results in over-all 
performance, whether applied to production, quality, 
research, safety, public relations or any of the other 
suggested areas (p. 245). 
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In order for a manager to commit to those activities which "promise 
to contribute to the greatest improvement in over-all performance," 
knowledge of the relative importance of each activity is essential. 
The knowledge of each activity's importance may be transmitted 
from the owner or individual in charge. In cases where this informa-
tion is not given, managers and decision makers must impute their own 
value judgments (see Keeney and Raiffa, 1976, p. 67). This application 
of personal value judgments may lead to unexpected results. 
Granick (1954) cites a study in the Soviet Union where multiple 
measures of performance have been introduced. In implementing the 
system, there was no indication of the relative importance of each 
measure. Subsequent actions by the managers suggest that they assumed 
meeting production quotas to be of prime importance. However, perform-
ance evaluations indicate that other factors were more important than 
simply meeting the quotas. Some managers were acclaimed for satisfying 
production quotas while violating labor laws while others were removed 
from office for violating quality and assortment plans while fulfilling 
production quotas. These results indicate that meeting production quotas 
was more important than obeying labor laws, but was not as important 
as complying with quality and assortment plans. The imputed value 
judgments of the managers did not coincide with those of their superiors. 
Given the knowledge of the importance of each performance measure, 
there still remains the issue of how to make comparisons of performance. 
Schmidt and Kaplan (1971) review the two methods for making multiple 
measure comparisons. The fj_rst method involves combining the separate 
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measures in some way to form a composite measure. This measure then 
may be interpreted as an indication of the overall "success" or 11value-
to-the-organization" of each individual. Such a composite score may 
then serve as a basis of comparison between individuals (see Toops, 1944; 
Thorndike, 1948; Brogden and Taylor, 1950; and Nagel, 1953). 
The alternative to a composite measure is simply a comparison by 
each individual measure. The argument presented is that measures of 
different variables should not be combined. Cattell (1957, p. 11) 
states this reasoning as follows: "Ten men and two bottles of beer 
cannot be added to give the same total as two men and ten bottles of 
beer." Proponents of this view argue that if the multiple measures 
display low positive, zero, or low negative correlations with one 
another, then they are obviously measuring different variables, and 
weighting them into a composite measure results in a score so ambiguous 
as to be uninterpretable (Schmidt and Kaplan, 1971, p. 420). 
Ghiselli, 1956; Guion, 1961; and Dunnette, 1963.) 
(See also 
In analyzing this issue, Schmidt and Kaplan (1971) suggest that if 
the goal of the performance measure is "practical and economic", then 
multiple measures can be, and in fact, at some time must be weighted 
in a composite measure. If all performance measures are considered to 
be measures of a single underlying economic construct, then a resulting 
composite may unambiguously represent the economic construct and would 
be interpretable as such. However, if the primary purpose of PE is 
increased understanding, weighting of the multiple measures into a 
composite is unnecessary. 
Though there are numerous works which discuss the use of single and 
multiple measures of performance, there has been little written on the 




Stedry (1960) looks at three approaches in reviewing the relation-
ship between performance evaluation information and the behavior of the 
individual being evaluated. His first approach is a mathematical model 
of individual behavior in a budget or goal attainment situation, His 
model assumes the presence of various performance levels and theorizes 
that the effects of budgeting on an individual's behavior is a function 
of various factors. These factors include the personality differences 
of those participating, the incentive structure used by management and 
the initial state of mind of each individual. The results of the model 
suggest that an understanding of the motivational structure of the 
individuals involved is necessary for proper application of a budgetary 
process. 
Stedry's second approach uses a laboratory study designed to 
indicate the degree of relationship between performance, aspiration 
levels and externally imposed budgets. Performance is examined using 
four sample groups; each subdivided further into a "low", "medium", and 
a "high budget". The "low budget" satisfies the often cited principle 
of "attainable but not too loose." The "medium budget" is set at a 
higher level of performance and the "high budget" is "mathematically 
incapable of attainment over all trials . . " (Stedry, 1960, p. 69). 
Stedry concludes that the budget level imposed in his experiment 
has a significant effect on performance. He also concludes that the 
influence of aspiration levels on performance varies depending on 
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whether aspiration levels are established before or after the budget is 
received and on the budget level employed. 
Stedry's third approach uses a linear programming formulation to 
examine the effects of having subgroups within an organization (i.e., 
departments or divisions) attempt to maximize their performance devoid 
of overall organizational consideration. Stedry concludes from this 
experiment that having each subunit attempt to concentrate on its own 
goals will not necessarily lead to the best possible overall organiza-
tional performance. 
It is important to note that in the introduction to his study, 
Stedry (1960, p. 2) states, "As it will be treated-here; the objective of 
budget control is to increase long-run profit at the fastest possible 
rate; or alternatively, at a given output, to reduce costs at a fastest 
possible rate." In other words, satisfying the budget in a period is the 
same concept as maximizing profit during the period. The use of one 
budgeted factor as seen in all three of Stedry's approaches is 
tandamount to maximizing a single measure of performance. Thus, the 
conclusions drawn from these approaches may be applied to the maximiza-
tion of the single performance measure of profit. 
Charnes and Stedry (1964) examine three models of managerial 
behavior in relation to budget systems. The first model considers a 
supervisor with one goal, typically a level of profit attainment. 
Rewards to the supervisor are directly associated with attainment of 
this goal and it is assumed that this relationship will aid in the 
internalization of the budget by the supervisor. 
From the analysis, Charnes and Stedry conclude that budget changes 
which affect performance such that aspirations increase rather than 
decrease or remain unchanged result in higher performance. The impli-
cation is that budgets should be based on trends and improvements 
rather than on a fixed level of attainment. 
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The second model deals with the behavior of a supervisor faced with 
multiple budgeted tasks and evaluated under a type of "management by 
exception" reward system. The process by which effort is allocated to 
the various tasks is dependent on the size of the difference between 
actual and aspired performance levels and the rewards attached to each 
budget. Charnes and Stedry conclude that the allocation of effort by 
the subordinate may be quite different from the allocation embedded in 
the goals of the superior. Charnes and Stedry indicate that three 
options are available to the superior. The superior may (1) use a 
different reward structure, (2) use a different stated goal or set of 
goals from that desired, or (3) attempt to train supervisors to behave 
in a nonself-optimizing manner. 
The third model employed by Charnes and Stedry is developed from 
the theory of search and allows for diminishing returns to scale with 
increasing effort. This model addresses the problem of how to increase 
effort to a particular area of a multiple budget task setting. Charnes 
and Stedry conclude from this model that increasing the difficulty of 
reaching budget in an area can, up to a point, improve performance; but 
after a critical level is reached, performance decreases sharply. 
In a subsequent study, Charnes and Stedry (1966) discuss the same 
issues under four motivational assumptions. One of the assumptions 
considers the maximization of expected reward where the reward is 
proportional to expected profit. The other assumptions relate to 
attainment, nonattainment and over attainment of a budgeted level of 
performance in a multiple budget task setting. For the second set of 
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assumptions, the problem is stated "in terms of designing a set of 
goals which will produce the same effort allocations--and performance--
as profit maximization" (Charnes and Stedry, 1966, p. 475). 
Charnes and Stedry develop heuristic approximations to some of the 
optimization procedures. They conclude by indicating that the heuristic 
approximation models developed may be useful for providing predictions 
of individual behavior. 
Demski (1970) discusses the implementation effects of alternative 
performance evaluation methods. A simulation of the production 
smoothing decision is constructed in a single product firm. It is 
assumed that the decision maker will attempt to implement a given 
production schedule in a manner that will optimize his performance 
measurement. The decision maker is evaluated on a profitability 
indicator calculated under direct, absorption and an ex post costing 
system. Results of the simulation suggest that varying the· evaluation 
method could significantly alter the decision maker's activities and 
thus the profit generated by the firm. 
Demski (1971) essentially reworks the 1970 study using a multi-
product firm. As in the single product firm, the decision maker is 
evaluated on a profitability measure calculated under various costing 
methods. A simulation is constructed of a firm with three main products, 
each with subassembly alternatives. Also included in this simulation 
are advertising decisions for each of the three products. The results 
indicate that altering the performance measuring methods significantly 
affect the activities and perfonnance of the decision makers. 
Both of Demski's simulation experiments assume that decision makers 
preceive their rewards as a linear function of the profits contributed 
by their subunit. The performance measures used in both experiments 
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simply consist of profit calculated under different accounting conven-
tions. Thus, these two studies indicate that varying the method by 
which profit is calculated affects the activities and performance of 
the decision makers. 
Swieringa and Demski (1971) use a simulation study to examine the 
effects of selected performance measures and incentive alternatives on 
the behavior of the decision maker. In their simulation, a linear 
programming model is used to centrally determine all marketing and 
production decisions which are to be implemented by the supervisors. 
Behavior of the supervisors is assumed to be affected by the measures 
used to evaluate their performance as well as the incentive alternatives 
engaged. Four performance measures (i.e., direct, absorption, ex post, 
and a combined costing system) under two incentive reward systems 
(i.e., linear function of reported profit and linear function of 
reported profit only outside of an established range) are employed. 
Swieringa and Demski (1971) -conclude that: 
.•. production supervisor's implementation behavior 
resulted in significantly higher profit levels under each 
of the two incentive system alternatives when his 
performance measure and implementation activities were 
not limited to variations within the production 
departments only (p. 441). 
Also noted is that reported profit levels were sensitive to restrictions 
placed on the scope of the supervisor's information seeking and imple-
mentation activites. 
Irish (1970) endeavored to address how the measurement of the 
division manager's performance can be best expressed in terms of 
accounting data. Irish interviewed 35 executives (mostly controllers) 
at various management levels and from various Fortune 1000 firms. Those 
interviewed strongly agreed that profit as a measurement criterion, or 
return on investment cannot be used exclusively as they do not gauge 
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how well the manager is fulfilling long-term objectives. They conclude 
that the operating performance of the manager should be measured with 
respect to all divisional objectives. 
Summary 
A review of the literature presents considerable discussion on the 
appropriateness of a single, multiple.or multiple composite measures of 
performance evaluation. Profit has traditionally been identified as the 
measure used in a single measure PE system. It is suggested by many that 
a single measure of profitability in any- of its many forms may not be the 
appropriate measure by which owners may influence beneficial managerial 
behavior. Though the idea of using multiple measures has been discussed 
and debated for some time, little if any empirical data have been 
gathered comparing the results of using a single as opposed toa multiple 
measure PE system. This study addresses that issue. 
CHAPTER III 
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
PERFOR1'1ANCE EVALUATION 
In describing the role of management accounting in influencing 
management behavior, Caplan (1971, p. 3) suggests the following tasks: 
the setting of goals; informing individuals what they must do to con-
tribute to the accomplishment of these goals; motivating desirable 
performance; evaluating performance; and suggesting when corrective 
actions must be taken. Essentially, Caplan is indicating the intregal 
part that management accounting has in the evaluation of managerial 
performance. 
Recognition of the role of the management accountant in PE leads 
to the need for a theoretical.basis upon which to perform the evalua-
tion. The basic point of interest is not if a PE system should be 
used, but which of the many alternative types of PE systems should be 
selected and how may it be employed so as to encourage those being 
evaluated to conform to the objectives of the evaluation. 
The theoretical background for employing a PE system is discussed 
in the following sections. Discussion based on the theoretical develop-
ment is then centered on the appropriateness of short term profit as a 
single measure of PE versus use of multiple PE measures. A statement 
of testable hypotheses suggested by the discussion follows. 
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Theoretical Background 
Consider initially an organization where the owner and manager 
are the same person in a single period environment. In this setting, 
Demski (1972) concludes that performance evaluation issues are not 
present. That is, if an owner-manager, after acquiring information, 
selects what is felt to be an optimal alternative, there is no reason 
for retrospective analysis of this decision by that same individual. 1 
Only if the owner functions in a multiperiod environment or delegates. 
choice of action to another individual or group of individuals does a 
retrospective analysis of the chosen decision become meaningful. 
In a multiperiod environment, retrospective analysis provides 
information concerning results of decisions made by the owner during 
the past period. This information may then be of use to the owner in 
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making decisions in future periods. When choice selection is delegated 
by the owner to another individual, the purpose of retrospective 
analysis changes substantially. 
Asswne the owner delegates choice of action to a second individual 
(i.e., the manager). Retrospective analysis (PE) allows the examination 
of the manager's choice selection in light of the preferences of the 
owner. Thus, one purpose of PE is to motivate the manager to behave in 
a manner deemed optimal by the owner (Demski, 1972; Jensen.and Meckling, 
1976). 
1such an evaluation would consist of analyzing whether a decision 
one makes given a set of information is the same decision the same 




The above concepts can be stated formally. Assume that both the 
owner and manager are rational in the sense of satisfying a set of 
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utility axioms. Thus, if the owner and manager are the same person, 
the owner faces the problem of selecting an alternative from among a 
set of alternatives such that the selection maximizes the owner's 
expected utility (Demski, 1972; Ross, 1973). 
In the case where the owner and manager are not the same person, 
the problem the owner faces changes from choosing the optimal alterna-
tive to the selection of a PE system. That is, the manager is now 
delegated the responsibility of choosing among alternatives while the 
owner influences the manager's decision by selecting the PE system 
employed to evaluate the manager's performance. The PE system consists 
of two components, the performance measure and the incentive function. 
These two components will be selected so as to maximize the expected 
utility of the owner. 4 Hence the owner's problem can be formulated as: 
where 
2 
max J g(•),m(•) s u0 [p(s,a(•), g, m) - g(m(•), s)] ¢ 0 (s) 
the owner's utility function, 
a specific incentive function dependent on the actual 
performance statistic, 
For a detailed discussion see Demski (1972). 
(1) 
3nifferent sets of axioms that imply the existence of utilities 
with the property that expected utility is an appropriate guide for 
consistent decision making are presented in von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1947), Savage (195Lf), Luce and Raiffa (1957), Pratt, Raiffa and 
Schlaifer (1965), and Fishburn (1970). 
4 The manager's problem is to select the action which will maximize 
the expected utility of the manager given the performance measure and 
incentive function. 
a specific performance measurement method, 
o; alternative selected by the manager given g( ) and m( ), 
s = state of nature, 
o.wner' s subjective probability distribution over the 
states of nature, and 
outcome measure expressed in monetary terms (such as 
profit). 
Several comments should be made about the above model. First, it 
is a single period model. Next (g*, m*) represent the optimal 
incentive-measurement pair and depend on both the manager and the 
decision problem faced. Also notice that the monetary return to the 
owner is the actual monetary return p(•) less the financial compensa-
tion to the manager g(•). 
Extension of this model into multiple periods requires no altera-
tion if the results from one decision have absolutely no influence on 
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future decisions. In the situation in which prior choices and outcomes 
may influence future choices and outcomes, slight modification of the 
single period model is necessary. 
An index "t" will be used to denote the period where t = 1, •.. , T 
is treated as a strictly ordered sequence of known decisions that must 
be made (e.g., sequential periodic decisions). Outcome and probability 
functions as well as the action and state sets are labeled with this 
period index. It is assumed that decisions or period are linked by 
conunon knowledge of past actions 





-1 1 2 t 
(a , a , a , ... , a ) and 
-1 1 2 t 
(r , r , r , •.. , r ). Also 
assumed is an additive multiperiod utility function for both the owner 
and manager. 
Essentially what is developed is an adaption of the single period 
model which requires recognition of the effect of prior actions and 
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outcomes on future period outcomes. Notationally the owner's problem 
can now be formulated as: 
max 
- g(•),m(•) 
f t t t t st {u0 (p (s ,a(•), -t .. a ' t g, m) - g(m(•), s )) 
f t+ 1 ( (-t ( ) ) (-t t ( ) ) ) } + 0 r , m • , a , a • , g, m 
t -t 
<J?0 (s /r) t 1, •.• , T 
Short Run Profit as a Performance -Standard 
Single Period Framework 
(2) 
Examining the use of short-run profit maximization as the perform-
ance standard in light of the above models provides useful insight. 
Short-run profit maximization assumes that the planning horizon extends 
for a single period (Williamson, 1964). Thus short-run profit maximi-
zation has a single period perspective similar to equation (1). However, 
profit maximization is not necessarily equivalent to maximization of 
expected utility of the owner. For example, let m be a profit measure 
and let g = f(m) be an incentive function (usually linear) with the 
property f~(m) > 0. Assume the owner is risk neutral and the manager 
is risk adverse. Under these conditions it is conceivable that the 
manager would reject projects that the owner would accept. 5 Generally, 
whenever the risk preferences of the owner and manager differ, there 
may be situations in which the actions of the manager adversely affect 
the interests of the owner. 
5see Demski (1972) for an example. 
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Consider the situation where both the manager and owner are risk 
neutral. Here the certainty equivalent of both the manager and owner 
6 
will be equal to the expected monetary value. Furthermore, maximiza-
tion of expected utility for each is equivalent to wealth maximization. 
Thus, whenever linear approximation to utility functions over the 
feasible range is assumed, short-run profit maximization may be adequate 
as a performance standard in a single period environment. 
Certainly, in a pragmatic sense some operational standard is 
needed. Utility maximization is properly viewed as the objective of 
the owner and manager. However, a workable proxy objective very well 
may be wealth maximization. For example, even if both manager and owner 
are risk averse (as is the most likely case) the assumption of risk 
neutrality and the resulting wealth maximization objective may serve 
as a reasonable operational approximization. Moreover, in a single 
period environment profit maximization is essentially equivalent to 
wealth maximization. In this study maximization of wealth is treated 
as maximization of the owner's utility. 
Wealth maximization is defined in the traditional economic sense 
of 11well-offness". With regard to wealth an owner derives from a 
business enterprise, well-offness is a function of cash flows produced 
during the period as well as the expectation of future cash flows 
resulting from the terminal position of the firm (see Solomons, 1965, 
p. 277). In a single period environment, no future cash flows are 
6The certainty equivalent of a lottery is d~fined as a dollar 
amount, CE, such that the decision maker is indifferent between 
playing the lottery or accepting the a1110unt, CE, for certain. 
Formally, U(CE) = E U(X) where X represents the uncertain amount 
obtainable from the lottery. 
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expected and thus the wealth of the firm is simply the cash inflow 
during the period (profit). 
Multiple Period Framework 
Unfortunately, financial decisions are intrinsically multiperiod 
problems. For a multiperiod environment, one may retain the proxy 
objective of wealth maximization. However, short-run profit maximiza-
tion is no longer necessarily equivalent to wealth maximization. To 
illustrate the difficulty, consider the definition of objectives and 
attributes given by Keeney and Raiffa (1976). An objective indicates 
the direction in which one should move while an attribute is an identi-
fiabile measure which indicates the degree to which alternative 
activities meet the objective. 
In terms of using profitability as a surrogate for wealth in an 
owner-manager relationship, the objective of interest is maximization 
of wealth while the attribute by which thiS objective is measured 
typically has been short-run profitability. Whether or not profitability 
should be the objective by which wealth is measured now becomes the point 
of interest. 
Keeney and Raiffa (1976) list five desirable properties for any 
set of attributes: 
1. Completeness. Knowledge of the level of the attributes 
provides a clear understanding of the extent the associated 
objective is achieved. 
2. Operational. Attributes are operational if they are meaningful 
to the owner and manager and facilitate explanation to others. 
3. Decomposable. Multiattribute utility assessment can be broken 
into parts of smaller dimensionality. 
4. Non Redunda!l--97_· The attributes should be defined to avoid 
double counting. 
5. ~-i_n_i~. The set should be only large enough to ensure 
completeness. 
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In view of the properties suggested for a set of attributes, causal 
evidence exists suggesting that use of the single attribute of short-run 
profitability violates the prcperty of completeness. Matz and Usry 
(1976) summarize this point as follows: 
A single measure of performance (e.g., return on capital 
employed) may result in a fixation on improving the components 
of the one measure to the neglect of needed attention to other 
desirable activities--both short- and long-run (p. 880). [also 
see Newman and Logan, 1955; Warren, 1966] 
Numerous examples of dysfunctional behavior in an environment using 
short-run profitability as the single standard of performance evalua-
tion may be found in the literature. 
Granick (1954) cites a study in the Soviet Union in which the 
single criterion of profitability was rejected because its use led to 
a reduction in experimental work and de-emphasized the importance of 
production quantity, quality, and ass-0rtment. Later reforms shifted 
emphasis away from this single criterion. 
Warren (1966) cites the following account of a division manager 
in a large chemical company: 
He pointed out that his sales manager, on one occasion, 
has laid off three missionary salesmen to reduce costs for 
the last quarter of a given year so as to meet his budgeted 
profit goals. He knows that replacements for these three 
men would be needed in the spring as business increased, and 
it was estimated that the cost of finding, screening, and 
training new men was considerably higher than the payroll 
cost involved in keeping the three men. Although in principle 
he disapproved of the action, the division manager permitted 
it for the following reasons: (1) the year's profit 
objective would be met; (2) the firing and subsequent hiring 
would not be revealed in the summary data he presented to 
top management; and (3) because the profit goal had been 
met there would be no problem getting approval for sufficient 
funds in next year's budget to rehire three salesmen. 
The division manager commented that he was competing with 
more than 16 other divisions for recognition and funds and 
based on his experience his division would, he felt, be better 
off in the 'long run' if he showed a solid profit picture for 
the year. Such a picture, in his opinion, was the only way to 
get the funds he required to 'continue the work needed to 
build the long-run success of my division.' 
A subsequent analysis of the division's performance, 
however, showed a history of repeated short-run oriented 
behavior, such as that noted above. The more support and 
funds this manager received, the more he felt the need to do 
an even better job next year, more often than not, at the 
expense of the future. How long he could have kept on 
'mortgaging the future' became an academic question for him 
as his 'excellent results' led to his promotion. His 
successor was the man who had to 'face the music' (p. 65). 
Vogel (1981) indicates that the same situation continues presently: 
The typical Chief Executive Officer now holds office for 
an average of five years, compared to 10 years a generation 
ago. Since Chief Executive Officers tend to be judged and 
judge themselves by the profits reported while they are in 
charge, they are understandably reluctant to pursue long-term 
projects that depress current earnings and won't pay off 
until after they retire. Executives frequently criticize 
politicians for making decisions on the basis of short-term 
considerations in order to ensure their reelection. But the 
same indictment applies even more to managers in the private 
sector. Elected officials have a time horizon of at least 
two years, but executive promotions within companies often 
are based on earnings calculated on an annual basis. Aldo 
Morita, the chairman of Sony, recently observed: 'The annual 
bonus some American executives receive depends on annual 
profit, and the executive who knows his firn1's production 
facilities should be modernized isn't likely to make a 
decision to invest in new equipment if his own income and 
managerial ability are judged based only on annual profit 
••• I have heard many American managers say, ''Why should 
I sacrifice my profit for my successor?' ' (p. 22). 
Though Vogel is speaking specifically of the Chief Executive Officer, 
similar behavior may be seen in all levels of management. 
The above examples clearly indicate that the use of the single 
criterion of short-run profitability can lead to dysfunctional 
behavior. A likely hypothesis for this result is that short-run 
profitability is an incomplete attribute with respect to the owner's 
objective of wealth maximization. Short-run profitability appears to 
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be an incomplete attribute because it encourages behavior beneficial 
to the manager in the short run but detrimental to the owner in the 
long run. 
This behavior is possible because managers who do not expect to 
remain in a position for more than a short period of time may be able 
to enhance their short-run performance--and hence their own wealth--
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by avoiding long-run considerations. Neglecting long-run considerations 
will ultimately resuilt in detrimental effects to the company. However, 
as Warren points out above, due to the time lag necessary for these 
effects to be felt, the successor will suffer the consequences and not 
the present manager. 
In recognition of this very problem, General Electric adopted a 
multiple attribute emphasis. They identified eight "key result areas", 
upon which performance evaluation depended (Solomons, 1965; Caplan, 
1971; Anthony and Dearden, 1980). These key areas were: profitability; 
market position; productivity;· product leadership; personnel development; 
employee attitudes; public responsibility; balance between short-range 
and long-range goals. Ev_en though each of the first seven key areas 
had both short-range and long-range goals, the eighth area--balance 
between short-range and long-range goals had been specifically identified 
to make sure that the long-range health of the company would not be 
sacrificed for short-term gains (Anthony and Dearden, 1980, p. 109). 
Formally, this is equivalent to identifying a set of attributes which 
is complete with respect to wealth maximization. 
Employment of a set of attributes to analyze performance with 
respect to wealth maximization involves the issue of multiple or 
composite PE measures. As summarized in Chapter II, when the goal of 
the analysis is practical and economic, use of a composite measure is 
appropriate. As the purpose of the PE measures used in this study is 
to rank and reward performance, a composite measure is used in all 
7 
multiple attribute cases. 
Statement of Hypotheses 
The above analysis suggests two situations of interest. First, 
assume that a manager enters a long term appointment. Given the 
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knowledge of the long-run nature of the appointment, it may be suggested 
that maximization of personal welfare over the term of the appointment 
would be the objective of the manager. That is, the manager will act 
in a long-run manner so as to maintain over the long-run period of 
employment the evaluation measure of short-run profitability. Thus, 
one could speculate that the use of the single short term PE system 
with profitability as a standard should result in no difference in 
managerial behavior (and hence owner welfare) than will the use of a 
multiple PE system which contains both short-:t.un and long-run 
attributes. For a long term appointment, it can be argued that the 
best interests of the manager are served by exhibiting long-run 
behavior. Thus, it would not matter whether a single measure or a 
multiple measure PE system is used. This situation leads to the 
first hypothesis of interest. 
7rf multiple attribute analysis is used, then a vector of attribute 
measure scores for each case instead of a single composite score must be 
analyzed. Vector analysis will result in a division of the cases into 
two groups, dominated and nondominated. The vectors in the dominated 
group are inferior in all attribute scores to at least one other vector. 
Those vectors in the nondominated group each have at least one element 
score of the vector superior to the corresponding element in each of 
the other nondominated vectors. Beyond this two group division, 
further ranking is simply infeasible without combining the multiple 
measures into a single composite measure through the use of some 
decision rule. 
Hypothesis I: If a manager anticipates a long-run appointment, 
there will be no difference in the welfare of 
the owner resulting from the use of a PE system 
using the single attribute of short-run profit-
ability or a PE system using a composite of 
short-run and long-run attributes. 
Next, assume that a manager enters a short term appointment. If 
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the manager knows that performance will be evaluated only over a short-
run period, it may be suggested that the method by which the manager 
is evaluated will significantly affect behavior. Specifically, if the 
manager in this setting is evaluated through the use of a short-run 
profitability measure, it would be to the manager's self interest to 
maximize this short-run standard to the exclusion, indeed complete 
sacrifice of all long-run considerations. Such behavior would maximize 
short-run profit, but as the effect of sacrificing long-run variables 
began to be felt, the overall posture of the firm (and hence the welfare 
of the owner) would be adversely affected. Such was the situation in 
the case cited previously by Warren (1966). 
If, in place of a short-run profitability measure of performance, a 
multiple composite measure consisting of both short and long term 
attributes is used, the behavior of the manager may shift from a 
short-run orientation to a more balanced short- and long-run orienta-
tion. This is because the self interest of the manager is best served 
by considering long-run variables since these variables are included 
in calculating the manager's reward. Thus, if the manager knows that 
performance and hence reward are based on both long-run and short-run 
attributes, then attention will be devoted to both types of variables. 
Such behavior would eliminate many of the adverse effects resulting 
from single emphasis on short-run measure and as such would improve the 
posture of the firm and hence the ovmer's welfare. This leads to the 
second hypothesis of interest. 
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Hypothesis II: If a manager anticipates a short term appointment, 
then the welfare of the owner will be greater if 
a multiple composite measure PE system consisting 
of both short and long term attributes is used 
than if a PE system using a single short-run 
profitability measure of performance is employed. 
In each of the hypotheses stated, the length of appointment 
anticipated is held constant and performance results under two different 
measurement systems compared. Building on the logic used to develop 
Hypothesis I and Hypothesis II, two additional hypotheses of interest 
may be examined by holding the measurement systems constant and 
comparing performance results under two different tenure anticipations. 
Hypothesis III: If a PE system using a single short-run 
profitability measure of performance is used, 
the welfare of the owner will be greater if a 
long-run appointment is anticipated than if a 
short-run appointment is anticipated. 
Hypothesis IV: If a PE system using a composite of short-run 
and long-run attributes is used, there will be 
no difference in the welfare of the owner 
resulting from anticipation of a long-run or 
a short-run appointment. 
Summary 
This chapter has presented a theoretical development of PE. This 
development suggests that for a single period where the owner and 
manager are the same individual, there exists no need for PE. For an 
owner-manager in a multiple period setting, retrospective analysis may 
enhance future decision making. When the owner and manager are 
different individuals, PE allows for an examination of the manager's 
choice selection in light of the preferences of the owner. This 
setting is the focus of this study. In this situation, the owner 
is faced with choosing the PE system which will encourage the manager 
to choose those alternatives most beneficial to the owner. This 
discussion is examined in both a single and a multiple period setting. 
The issue of short-run profit as the single measure by which 
performance is evaluated is discussed. Maximization of wealth is 
suggested as a suitable proxy for maximization of owner's benefit 
(utility). Wealth is defined in the traditional economic sense of 
"well-offness" and in a single period setting, maximization of short-
run profit is deemed to be equivalent to maximization of wealth. 
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When the analysis moves to a multiple period setting, short-run 
profit is found to be an incomplete measure of wealth because it fails 
to exact attention on long run economic factors. Several illustrations 
of dysfunctional behavior resulting from the use of a single measure of 
performance are cited. 
As a result of this discussion, four testable hypotheses are 
developed. The first suggests that in a long term appointment, 
performance (decision) should not be significantly affected by the use 
of the two different performance measures~ The second suggests that in 
a short term appointment, performance is expected to be more beneficial 
to the owner of the firm under the use of a composite short-run and 
long-run performance measure than under a single short-run profit 
measure. The third suggests that if a single short-run profitability 
PE measure is employed, anticipation of a long-run appointment will 
result in more benefit to the owner than will anticipation of a short-
run appointment. The fourth suggests that if a composite short-run 
and long-run performance measure is employed, anticipated length of 
tenure should not affect performance. 
CHAPTER IV 
CHOOSING AND SCALING ATTRIBUTES 
The use of multiple measure models requires four basic activities. 1 
The first of these entails the selection of attributes (identifiable 
measures) which indicate the degree to which alternative cources of 
action meet the desired objective. The second activity then scales 
those attributes selected to transform single physical measures into 
measures of value or suitability. The third activity assigns importance 
in the form of weights to the multiple attributes. The fourth activity 
is the selection of a decision rule to combine attributes and rank 
alternatives in one step. 
A discussion of choosing and scaling attributes for a multiple 
measure model is found in this chapter, while the remaining two activities 
are discussed in Chapter V. General procedures for choosing attributes 
are discussed, followed by an examination of the attributes chosen for 
use in this study. A general discussion on scaling reviews methods 
available and presents an explanation of the various value functions 
that can be developed. Discussion then focuses on the specific scaling 
procedures used in this study. 
1The discussion in this chapter generally follows the discussion 
found in Hobbs, B. F., "Analytical Multiobjective Decision Methods for 
Power Plant Siting: A Review of Theory and Application," Division of 
Regional Studies, National Center for the Analysis of Energy Systems, 
Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, New York, August, 1979. 
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Choice of Attributes: General 
An activity is undertaken with some purpose in mind. This purpose 
or objective indicates the way in which one should move. In order to 
select from among a number of alternative PE systems, one must define 
the objective of interest and then identify specific characteristics 
(attributes) of the various alternatives. Identification of these 
attributes then allows for comparisons of the relative value of each 
alternative in accomplishing the objective. There are two basic 
approaches to choosing attributes: "bottom-up" and "top-down". A 
brief examination of each of these two approaches follows. 
Bottom-Up Approach 
The bottom-up approach simply lists important attributes as 
suggested by experience, literature, and experts in the field. 
Because of the different orientation and views of those selecting 
attributes, the resulting list may be long, perhaps too long. This 
list might be trimmed by eliminating variables which are unlikely to 
make a difference in the final measurement. One must be cautious of 
dropping attributes simply because it is not easy to obtain information 
or because they are difficult to quantify. This can introduce bias 
in measurement analysis toward "hard" considerations or attributes 
which are readily quantifiable, (e.g., profit) and away from softer 
or nonquantifiable attributes (e.g., public responsibility). This bias 
could significantly affect performance and hence attainment of the 
objective of interest. 
. . . It is easily demonstrated that even extreme 
inaccuracies in [decision] models will often have less 
effect on the probable quality of the solution than does 
unintended deletion from the problem description of 
possible outcomes or important attributes (Huber, 1974, 
p. 453). 
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One method of deciding whether it is worthwhile to gather data for 
a given attribute consists of examining the difference in the accomplish-
ment of the objective the attribute might make compared with the cost 
of data acquisition. The inherent difficulty is that in the bottom-up 
approach, no specific objective is identified a priori, and as such, the 
appropriateness of an attribute in evaluating an alternative action is 
essentially intuitive. Thus, the bottom-up approach does not provide 
any assurance that only important attributes are suggested nor does it 
assure that all relevant considerations are included as the concepts of 
important and relevant are dependent upon the unspecified purpose of the 
alternative actions. 
Top-Down Approach 
The top-down approach begins by identifying the overall objective 
of interest. Knowledge of the objective should then be used as a 
guide in selecting specific attributes and in making decisions 
(Rutherford et al., 1972). Between objectives and attributes there 
may be sub-objectives. For example, the attribute "sales volume" might 
be under the sub-objective "maximize market share", a component of the 
objective "maximize wealth''. By starting at the top (the objective) 
and working downward, a hierarchy can be developed. This development 
should encompass all relevant considerations and include only those 
attributes which are important to the objective of interest. 
In constructing such a hierarchy the properties of completeness, 
operational, decomposable, non-'-redundancy, and minimal suggested 
by Keeney and Raiffa (1976) should be kept in mind. Satisfying these 
properties in constructing a hierarchy is not a simple task. One is 
forced to think systematically about relationships between objectives 
and attributes which may make later value judgments easier. 
Choice of Attributes for PE 
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The purpose of PE from an owner's point of view is to encourage the 
manager to select those activities (decisions) which will provide the 
maximum benefit to the owner. The objective of interest as previously 
identified is the maximization of owner's wealth. Various attributes 
are the alternatives from which a selection must be made. Having 
identified the objective of interest, the top-down approach is used 
to select the four attributes used in this study. 
The attributes used were selected under the guidance of the 
attribute properties suggested by Keeney and Raiffa (1976). These 
attributes include a measure of productive efficiency and a measure of 
market effectiveness as suggested by Solomons (1965). The 'productive 
efficiency measure (PM) is found in terms of input units to output 
units in period t as compared to the same relationship in period t-1. 
A high PM factor indicates improvement of the input-output relationship 
over the prior period. This improvement is reflected in the amount 
(cost) of inputs per output or,in other terms, in a decrease in the 
variable cost ratio. 
The market effectiveness measure (MSM) reflects a measure of 
market share. This measure is calculated as the firm's periodic sales 
value divided by the total market sales in the period. All firms 
begin with the same sales volume. In this study, market sales volume 
is initially set at $500,000 and increases $5,000 per period. The 
larger the MSH factor, the larger the portion of the market claimed 
by the firm. 
The third attribute used in the study is that of profit (RORM). 
This measure is calculated as the firm's periodic net income divided 
by the initial investment of $80,000. A high RORM factor represents 
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a large net income. A low or negative factor represents a low periodic 
net income or a loss. 
The fourth attribute used in this study is a measure of productive 
(capacity) maintenance (CMM). This measure is calculated in terms of 
periodic capacity. A high QM factor represents maintenance of produc-
tive capacity. 
The four attributes selected--productive efficiency, market 
standing, profitability and productive capacity--form a multiple measure 
which has the five desirable attributes of completeness, operational, 
decomposible, non redundancy and minimal suggested by Keeney and Raiffa 
(1976). In selecting these four attributes of performance, all basic 
functions of a manufacturing process are represented. The basic 
components of business survival include the capacity, equipment and 
accessibility necessary to facilitate production, ability to produce 
marketable products economically, the ability to sell those products 
produced and the ability to operate with a profit. The ability to 
function well in all four of these areas usually insures the success 
of the firm. Lack of any of these four components for any substantial 
period of time can result in the failure of the firm. Thus the set 
appears to be complete as well as minimal and nonredundant. That the 
attribute set is operational has been verified in the four operational 
measures developed for use in this study. The desired property of 
decomposibility is illustrated in Figure 1. Note that each of the 















































This study suggests that in selecting a measure of wealth maximi-
zation, economic measures of productive efficiency, market effectiveness, 
profitability and productive maintenance constitute a complete yet 
minimal set of relevant attributes. The five measures indicated by 
Drucker (1954)--market standing, innovation, productivity, physical 
and financial resources and profitability--can easily be rearranged 
into the four measures suggested by this study. Likewise, the economic 
"key areas" suggested by General Electric (Solomons,· 1965) of profit-
ability, market position, productivity and product leadership are also 
amenable to those categories suggested in this study. 
Scaling 
Once attributes have been chosen, there must be a transformation 
to measures of value or suitability. This transformation is connnonly 
referred to as value or utility scaling. The input to such a 
transformation is objective in nature (independent of the measurer) 
while the output is subjective in nature (a function of the measurer's 
judgment and preferences). Scaling methods may be categorized by 
three recognized types of measurement levels: ordinal, interval, and 
ratio (see Stevens, 1946). A brief discussion of each of the three 
levels follows. 
Ordinal Scaling 
In this general approach, levels of an attribute are classified 
into two or more categories. Examples include: 
1. Acceptable and unacceptable 
2. Poor, average, good, excellent 
3. Hot, warm, cool and cold or 
4. 1, 2, 3, 4 respectively. 
Ordinal scaling analysis allows only for comparisons (<, =, >); the 
algebraic operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication and 
division are invalid. In essence, ordinal scaling is a simple ranking 
of attributes based on some factor. 
The advantage of ordinal scaling is that it is rather simple to 
employ. There is no conceptual limit to the number of categories that 
can be ranked. The inability to define how much "better" or "worse" 
one level is in relation to another level is a disadvantage of ordinal 
scaling. Another difficulty is that.risk and uncertainty cannot be 
taken into account rigorously. 
In practice, judgment is used to create discrete ordinal value 
functions. A decision maker or group simply ranks or classifies the 
categories or levels of each attribute. Classification of attributes 
might be accomplished using the average of the responses from a Delphi 
or Nominal Group exercise. Thurstone's Law of Comparative Judgment 
(Thurstone, 1959) may also be used by groups to rank order categories 
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of an attribute. This method uses a large sample of pairwise preference 
judgments to create an ordinal scale. 
Interval Scaling 
Interval scaling results in scales on which differences can be 
measured and are meaningful. An interval scale has an arbitrary zero 
point. Only the operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication 
and division by a constant are valid. 
A typical example of interval scaling is the budgeting process. 
A budgeted amount is determined (an arbitrary zero point) and actual 
amounts are then referrenced to the budgeted level. 
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Interval scaling forces numerical rating which is more difficult 
than simple ranking for decision makers unused to making such judgments. 
Interval scaling does allow for risk and uncertainty in the construction 
of the various interval limits. 
Ratio Scalin_g 
Ratio scaling results in a scale whose intervals are meaningful and 
whose zero point signifies zero amount of the quantity. Profit in 
terms of dollars is a typical example. Zero profit indicates zero 
quantity of dollars. Under this method, statements such as "X is twice 
as large as Y" make sense. 
This is the most flexible scaling method. Multiplication and 
division by interval- or higher-scaled variables can often be performed 
(in addition to the algebraic operations permitted with interval 
scaling), while still preserving at least an interval level of scaling. 
The advantage of ratio scaling lies in the amount of information 
that it provides. Risk and uncertainty can be an integral part of 
the ratio scaling. A difficulty arises in that for many attributes 
there is no identifiable, absolute zero point• 
Value Scaling of Attributes 
The previous section discusses three basic measurement methods 
for scaling attributes. Each method examined defines the levels of 
the scaling established in a different manner. Ordinal scaling methods 
result in a simple "better than", "equal to", or "worse than" type of 
comparison. No consideration of the degree of difference between two 
levels of an attribute is available. Consequently, no algebraic 
manipulation of attribute levels is valid. 
Interval scaling methods do allow for comparisons of differences 
between different levels of an attribute. Algebraic manipulations of 
addition, subtraction, multiplication and division by a constant are 
valid. Concepts such as level 1 constitutes $1,000 net income per 
period less than level 2 are valid and useful. Since the zero amount 
in an interval scaled function is arbitrary, natural comparisons of 
value between levels of an attribute are not valid. 
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Natural comparisons between various levels of an attribute are 
permitted under ratio scaling. This i.s due to the nature of the 
nonarbitrary zero point of ratio scaled functions. For instance, $0 
means an absence of profit and thus serves as a natural origin. Those 
interval scales which have a natural origin allow for direct comparisons 
between different levels of an attribute which make sense, e.g., $10 in 
profit is twice the value of $5. Obviously the interrelationship need 
not be linear nor constant over the total range of attribute levels. 
It must also be noted that for most any attribute identified, a 
value function of any of the three types of levels discussed may be 
constructed, For instance, the attribute rrsales volume" (an objective-
independent of the measurer-input) can be converted into the following 
value scales (subjective--a function of the measurer's judgment and 
preferences-output): 
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Ordinal: High volume, Medium volume, Low volume. 
Interval: ... , -2, -1, 0, 1, 2", 3, 4, ... where 100,000 units of 
sales constitute level 0 and levels increment by 
10,000 units. 
Ratio: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4., ... units sold. 
Scaling of PE Attributes 
Hobbs (1979) suggests four categories for evaluating the use of 
alternative methods. He suggests examining selection of alternatives 
with respect to the following: 
1. Theoretical Validity. This refers to the extent to which the 
method chooses alternative X over alternative Y when X is 
actually preferred to Y by the decision maker. 
2. Flexibility. This refers to the number of alternatives and 
attributes that can be handled, normative and descriptive 
characteristics of the method and theease with which 
implications of different perspectives can be determined 
3. Results Compared to Other Methods. This refers to the extent 
to which alternative methods yield the same judgements. 
4. Ease of Use. This refers to the time and cost involved, the 
degree of expertise required to understand the purpose, 
assumptions and general workings of the method and the extent 
to which decision makers believe that the method can reliably 
reflect their performance. 
In this study, a scaling model which results in an interval level 
measurement is used. Examination of the four measures proposed for use 
in this study reveals a difference in the numeric range of each measure 
score. For instance, PM theoretically may vary from .950 to 1.680, 
MSM from 0.0 to+=, RORM from - 00 to +00 and CM from 0.0 to 1.0. These 
scale ranges for each attribute must be the same or implicit weighting 
of the individual attributes in constructing a composite score will occur. 
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In response to the need for equal scale ranges, the direct rating 
method was employed in constructing a standard continuum against which 
performance in each of the attributes is measured. This method uses a 
subjective continuum for each attribute. The continuum usually consists 
of a vertical or horizontal line with guideposts assigned numerical 
values. An expert or group of experts are then asked to rate how much 
each alternative contains of each attribute by identifying where it 
falls on the continuum (see Guilford, 1954). 
In constructing these scales, the range of possible attribute 
measure values was categoried by the researcher into 11 components. 
The lowest component was assigned a value (points) of -1.0. Each 
successive level from the lowest to the best received an incremental 
.2 value. Thus, the lowest interval resulted in a value (points) of 
-1.0, the middle interval 0.0 and the highest interval +1.0 (see 
Appendix A). 
This type of scaling model was chosen for several reasons. First, 
as shall be explained in the following chapter, the multiple attribute 
model used for comparing subject performances requires only an interval 
scaled value function. Thus, the added difficulties of obtaining a 
ratio scaled value function are unnecessary. The direct rating approach 
is theoretically valid and has been found to produce results similar 
to other more complex methods. 
Perhaps of greatest practical importance in the choice of this 
scaling model is the flexibility and ease of use which it provides. 
Experience suggests that the practical usefulness of any program applied 
in a business is in part directly a function of its flexibility and 
simplicity. The direct rating approach is straight forward and easily 
understood. Introduction of this approach would be more acceptable to 
the business community than would more complicated methods because of 
flexibility and simplicity. Other interval value approaches are 
available (i.e., deterministic questioning, gambling method, etc.), 
but tend to be more complicated than the direct rating method. 
In addition, the nature of business changes over time. These 
changes require a scaling system which can be easily and quickly 
adjusted to the various ranges of attribute values that may occur. 
This flexibility is also necessary for the simulated environment 
constructed for this experiment. Due to the cumulative nature of 
the attribute measures used in the business game, the range of 
possible measure values changes from period to period. While main-
. taining the same number of value intervals and the same point 
allocation, the direct rating technique allows for period by period 
reassignment of interval limits. Thus, the same form of scaling is 
used for all attributes over all periods. Only the values ·of each 
attribute interval are reassigned as necessary. 
Summary 
This chapter has examined the issues of choosing and scaling 
attributes in a multiple attribute system. Two basic approaches to 
attribute choice are examined. The bottom:_up approach lists all 
attributes of an objective as suggested by experience, literature, 
and "experts" in the field. Difficulties with this approach center on 
the inability to identify the attributes selected as relevant or 
important due to a clearly defined objective. 
The top-down approach to attribute selection is explained and 
reviewed. This approach first identifies the specific objective of 
interest and then based on that objective selects a set of attributes 
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which encompass all relevant considerations with regard to achievement 
of the objective. 
The top-down approach is then used for selection of a set of 
attributes to be used in managerial PE. Attributes selected include 
production efficiency, market effectiveness, profitability and 
productive maintenance. These attributes follow the four activities 
necessary for survival of a firm in the business community and satisfy 
the five properties suggested for a multiple attribute set by Keeney 
and Raiffa (1976). 
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Discussion then centers on the concept of scaling the various 
attributes to transform attribute scores into measures of value or 
suitability. Three types of scaling are discussed: ordinal; intermal; 
and ratio. Ordinal scaling simply ranks the attributes on the basis 
of some factor. No algebraic operations are feasible and direct com-
parisons between different levels of attribute values are meaningless. 
Interval scaling results in scales on which differences can be 
measured and are meaningful. Algebraic operations with a constant 
are valid; however, since an interval scale has an arbitrary zero point, 
no direct comparisons of the degree to which two attribute levels differ 
are valid. 
Ratio scaling is explained as essentially the same as an interval 
scale with a nonarbitraty zero point. Thus direct comparisons of the 
values of different attribute levels are valid in ratio scaling. 
Various methods for creating ordinal, interval and ratio scaled 
functions are examined and discussed. Direct rating is selected for use 
in this study in creating an interval scaled function. This method is 
selected due largely to its flexibility and east of use, requirements 
necessary for any measure suggested for practical application. 
CHAPTER V 
A LINEAR COMPOSITE RULE 
The discussion in the previous chapter centers on the selection and 
scaling of attributes for use in a multiple measure model. This chapter 
discusses the assignment of weights to the various attributes and 
selection of a decision rule to combine attributes and rank performances. 
The chapter will first review the general problem of ranking 
performance using multiple attributes. A decision rule will be 
suggested for use in this study. Approaches for weight allocation will 
be reviewed and a weighting system for the attributes in this study 
selected. This discussion will then be summarized. 
General Problem 
In those situations where performances are compared on the basis 
of only one attribute, ranking and selection of the optimal performance 
is simple and straightforward. When comparison is based on multiple 
attributes which are noncormnensurable, then ranking of performances 
and selection of the optimal performance is more difficult. 
The problem of performance selection using multiple attributes 
can be defined formally through a payoff matrix. Let r .. be the rating 
lJ 
of the i-th criterion on the j-th performance (i = 1, 2, ••. , m and 
j = 1, 2, ..• , n) as shown in Table I 
to less. 
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In this setting, performance k can undisputably be said to be 
superior to all other performances if and only if r.- > r .. for all i 
ik - lJ 
and j. Typically, the initial set of performances may be reduced in 
number by eliminating all dominated performances. That is, if 
r. > r. for all i with r .. > r. for some i, then performance z is 
lZ lY lJ lY 
said to dominate performance y. Based on the attributes selected, 
performance z would always be choosen over y. 
Elimination of dominated performances occasionally yields only 
one nondominated performance, In this case that performance would be 
the optimal performance and no further analysis would be required. 
More often, a set of nondominated performances result. Problems of 
this sort occur in many situations. For example, after eliminating 
20 of 25 applicants, which of the 5 remaining candidates should be 
hired? In the context of PE, a ranking of all performances is 
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desired. Thus, determining the worth of each performance is necessary. 
In discussing the problem faced in selecting among a set of 
multi-attribute alternatives, Goicoechea, Hansen and Duckstein 
(forthcoming) make the following observation: 
... Determining the worth of alternatives that vary on 
many dimensions presents formidable cognitive difficulties. 
People faced with such complex decisions react by reducing 
the task complexity by using various heuristics. 
Unfortunately it has been observed that decision makers 
who rely on heuristic decision rules systematically violate 
the expected utility principle. Moreover, decision makers 
tend to ignore many relevant variables in order to simplify 
their problem to a scale consistent with the limitations 
of the human intellect. While such simplification facili-
tates the actual decision making, it clearly can result in 
suboptimal behavior (p. 250). 
The above observation suggests that intuitive combination of 
information in an appropriate manner is extremely difficult. What is 
needed are analytical methods or decision rules which systematically 
help determine the worth of multiatttributed alternatives. A body of 
such decision rules exist in the literature. It is one of these many 
decision rules which has been selected for use in this study. 
A Recommended Decision Rule 
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The weighted average decision rule is probably the most frequently 
used comparative procedure and is the decision rule recormnended for 
use in this study. Essentially, numerical values for each r .. (from 
lJ 
Table I) are multiplied by weights assigned to each attribute. The 
resulting products are summed over each participant. The participant 
with the largest resulting summation is identified as the top 
performer. 
This concept can be stated numerically as follows. Let (w.: i = 
l 
1, 2, ••• , m) represent the set of weights assigned to each criterion 
(attribute). Let r .. represent a numerical value for the ith 
lJ 
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criterion and the jth performance. The worth of performance j can 









The weighted average decisioG rule is then used to rank each perform-
ance on the basis of its summed worth. In reconunending the use of the 
weighted average decision rule for use in this study, a review of the 
method in light of the criteria set forth by Hobbs (1979) as discussed 
in the previous chapter is undertaken. 
Theoretical Validity 
Two basic conditions must be satisfied to ensure theoretical 
validity in the use of the weighted average method. Two simplifying 
assumptions are made concerning the multiple attribute utility 
function of the owner to satisfy these conditions. 
The first condition is that each attribute's value or utility 
function is independent of the level of other attributes. This property 
is known as difference independence (Dyer and Sarin, 1977) or utility 
independence (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). The second condition, called 
preference independence, is that the tradeoffs among attributes to be 
made by a decision maker are independent of the levels of any of the 
attributes (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). · This property means, for 
instance, that a decision maker is willing to give up a certain amount 
of production volume to increase quality control regardless of the base 
level of production volume or quality control. 
The first simplifying assumption results in a linear single 
attribute utility function, i.e., 
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u(r .. ) 
1-J 
a. + b.r .. (V-2) 
1 1 lJ 
where b. > 0. This equation implies that each attribute is monotonically 
1 
increasing with respect to overall utility. For the plausible range of 
r .. (usually in the center range of the utility function) it can be 
lJ 
argued that the discrepancies between a nonlinear monotonic function 
and a linear function will not be significant. Many studies have 
indicated that unless the actual utility function is extraordinarily 
irregular, errors created by using a linear approximation tend to effect 
all alternatives in the same manner (Yntema and Torgerson, 1961; 
Fischer, 1972). Slavic and Lichtenstein (1971) and Tell (1976) survey 
studies which regress holistic (informal) judgments against attributes. 
They report that interactive terms rarely explain much of the variance, 
linear terms always dominate. 
The second simplifying assumption is that the total utility for 
the j-th performance, u.' 
J 
is an additive function of u(r .. ) for all i. 
lJ 
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a. is constant over all performances, the only parameters 
l 
needed to estimate rank order on the n performances are the weights 
for the various attributes (letting w. b.). 
1 l 
Flexibility 




that can be handled by the weighted average decision rule. One study at 
the Oak Ridge National Laboratory evaluated over 20,000 alternatives on 
29 attributes (Sarin, Dyer, and Nair, 1979). 
Sensitivity analyses are easily done with weighted averages. The 
only parameter to be analyzed consists of the weights (b.) assigned 
]_ 
to each attribute. The implications of different weight sets have been 
examined in a number of studies (see Hobbs, 1979). 
Results Compared to Other Methods 
Several decision rules have been developed for use with attribute 
value functions of an interval level of measurement. Weighted average 
is perhaps the simplest of these rules. Others include decision 
analysis, goal programming, the Power Law, Hurwicz procedures and 
ELECTRE. 
Hobbs (1979) reviews numerous studies comparing the results of the 
weighted average method with those of holistic methods as well as with 
the other rules cited above. Generally, results of the weighted 
average approach correlate very highly with the more complicated 
methods. 
Ease of Use 
The difficulty of the weighted averqge method depends on the 
attribute scaling and weighting methods used. The more complex the 
weighting methods, the more difficult the weighting summation method 
becomes. Still, this method is conceptually straightforward and with 
conventions of simplification becomes relatively simple to implement. 
It is more easily understood than most of the other multiattribute 
decision rules. 
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Use of Weighted Average 
Of basic interest in this study is the use of a multiple attribute 
decision rule which can be easily used in practical business environ-
ments. For use in that type of setting, a decision rule must be 
flexible, simple to understand, and easy to implement. The weighted 
average method provides these desired characteristics while maintaining 
its theoretical validity. It is for this purpose that the weighted 
average method is used in this.study. 
As previously noted, the only parameter that must be identified 
to facilitate use of the weighted average method are the weights 
assigned to the individual attributes. The next section discusses the 
process of weight selection and assignment. 
A Weighting Approach for PE 
There are two fundamentally different approaches to weight 
selection: (1) observer-derived and (2) client-explicated. Basic to 
the understanding of the different weighting results produced by these 
different methods is the difference in the perceived purpose of 
decision rules between the observer-derived and the client-explicated 
approaches. Client-explicated approaches provide feedback and 
consistancy checks which serve to make decisions more logical and 
reliable than those made by purely subjective choice. The purpose of 
decision rules in the observer-derived approach is to predict (imitate) 
the decision makers' unassisted global evaluations. A discussion of 
each of these two basic approaches in the context of PE follows. 
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Observer-Derived Approach 
Observer-derived techniques approach the weighting problem from a 
global or holistic evaluation view. Decision makers give overall 
evaluations of performance instead of attempting to assess the 
importance of each attribute. The global evaluations are then compared 
to the attribute scores by some decision rule (e.g., multiple regression, 
linear programming). This approach has been referred to as "policy 
capturing" and has been used in many settings (see Slovic and 
Lichtenstein, 1971; Huber, 1974). 
A major disadvantage of this approach is the lack of control the 
decision makers feel over the weighting process. Rather than making 
some value assessment of the importance of each attribute and then 
viewing the combination of their attribute assessments into an overall 
assessment, decision makers now make a series of overall assessments 
and are told via some complex statistical procedure their views on the 
importance of each attribute. This "backwardness" becomes even more 
irritating when the statistical procedures assign negative weights to 
attributes that are a priori positively related to suitability. 
The objective of using multiple attributes in PE is to focus 
attention on areas of activity which the attributes represent. The 
observer-derived approach would focus on an analysis of the overall 
evaluations of performance to assess what attributes received atten-
tion and in what relative proportion. Clearly, the observer-derived 
approach is inappropriate foL selecting weights in a multiple attribute 
PE problem. 
Client-Explicated Approach 
This approach consists of methods in which a decision maker 
directly selects weights. This selection is often made via a series 
of preference or tradeoff questions. The purpose of this approach is 
to make evaluations more rational and consistent, thereby improving 
decisions. 
The client-explicated approach is used in selecting attribute 
weights for this study. The purpose of the weighting done in this 
work is to influence the decisions of those being evaluated. The 
client-explicated approach allows direct selection of weights for each 
of the four attributes used in the multiple composite measure. 
Under this approach, there are many methods available for deter-
mining the allocation of value: ranking, rating, ratio questioning, 
Metfessel allocation, the indifference tradeoff method, the Churchman-
Ackoff technique, and decision analysis. Each method requires some 
form of subjective judgment on the part of the individual(s) setting 
the weights of the relative value of each attribute to the success of 
the objective. In this study, four attributes have been selected. 
Causal examination would indicate that achievement in all four areas 
is necessary for attainment of the desired objective of maximum long 
term wealth maximization. Since no one of the four attributes appears 
to be relatively more important in achieving wealth maximization, use 
of the ranking technique (or any of the other techniques) suggests 
equal weighting of the attributes used in this study. 
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Use of Equal Weights 
It is recognized that different allocations of value among the 
four attributes chosen for this study might be made. In an actual 
business environment, experience or some other factor might suggest 
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a slightly different weighting preference. The point of interest in 
this work is that a multiple measure PE system is used which forces 
participants to focus on each and all of the attributes of the measure. 
Placing equal weights on each of the four chosen attributes will 
accomplish this objective. Moreover, it should be noted that many 
studies have shown a high correlation of rankings produced by 
different weight sets. They conclude that unless significant value 
differences among the attributes appear, equal or even random weights 
are as useful as any of the methods discussed (see Dawes and Corrigan, 
1974; Wainer, 1976, Einhorn and Mccoach, 1977; Dawes, 1977). 
Varying the weights by placing more emphasis on one or two 
attributes and less on the others will tend to dim or brighten the 
focus on an individual attribute. Taken to the extreme, allocating 
100 percent of the weights on one measure and 0 pe~cent on each of 
the others results in the single measure PE system against which the 
multiple measure system is being compared. The identification of the 
level of weight allocation where focus on an individual attribute no 
longer occurs is deferred to a subsequent study. 
Exhibit IV in Appendix A illustrates the use of the weight 
allocation and decision rule discussed in this chapter. Note that at 
the bottom of the page the attribute measure scores from the fourth 
quarter of 19XO are listed. Points are found by taking the attribute 
score and finding the point assignment on the appropriate scale. 
Equal weighting is accomplished by simply summing the points received 
by each attribute. The weighted average decision rule then suggests 
that the best quarterly performance is achieved by that individual 
who obtains the highest total points. 
Surrnnary 
This chapter begins by reviewing the general problem of comparing 
performance when multiple noncommensurable attributes are employed. 
In such cases, the need for an objective analytical decision model 
is discussed and confirmed. 
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The weighted average decision model is chosen for use in this 
study. This model takes the numerical performance score for each 
attribute and multiplies it by the weights assigned to each attribute. 
The resulting products are then summed. The participants' performances 
are then ranked based on their summed score. 
The weighted average method is selected basically because of the 
ease in which it may be employed in a business environment. Its 
theoretical validity and performance compared to other decision rules 
are reviewed. 
Two basic approaches for setting weights are introduced and 
discussed. The first approach, observer-derived, attempts to predict 
or imitate decisions. Decision makers give overall evaluations of 
performance which are then compared to the attribute scores by some 
decision rule (e.g., multiple regression, linear programming). Results 
from the evaluation are then treated as the value (weights) that must 
have been used by the decision maker in arriving at the initial overall 
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evaluation, This approach is found to be inappropriate for use in this 
study. 
The second approach, client-explicated, consists of methods in 
which a decision maker directly selects weights. The ranking technique 
is applied to the four attributes in this study to produce weights of 
equal value. The concept of equal weighting is discussed with the 
conclusion that analysis of other weight allocations be deferred to 
subsequent studies. The use of the equal weights and the weighted 
average decision rule is illustrated. 
CHAPTER VI 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this study is to examine the issue of PE with 
regard to a divisional manager in a profit making setting. Preceding 
chapters have developed the need for this study, reviewed current 
literature on this issue and provided a theoretical development leading 
to the two testable hypotheses stated in Chapter III. The purpose of 
this chapter is to develop and explain the methodology used for testing 
the four hypotheses of interest. This development covers the following 
areas: selection of experimental methodology; the KDSS game; experi-
mental design; subject selection and sample size; PE measures employed 
and subject reward. This chapter concludes by giving a general 
overview of the actual process of the experiment. 
Experimental Methodology 
McGrath (1962) discussed four classifications of data-collection 
methods used in organization research: field studies; experimental 
simulations; laboratory experiments; and.computer simulations. Placed 
on an ordering continuum, these methods may be thought of as proceeding 
from the concrete (at the field study end) to the abstract (at the 
computer simulation end). Alternatively, the continuum can be labeled 
as going from realism to artificiality, or from an open to a closed 
setting, or from loose to controlled conditions. Of importance is the 
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fact that the methods differ in terms of the advantages they offer and 
the limitations they impose. Those at the field study end contain the 
advantages of realism and the operation of inherent motivational forces; 
disadvantages consist of complexity and lack of control by the 
researcher. At the other end of the scale, the advantages and disadvan~ 
tages are simply reversed. 
In examining the hypotheses in this study, as much realism as 
possible in the examination was desired. However, the difficulty of 
maintaining control of critical variables precluded the use of a field 
study. Therefore, an experimental simulation was employed which 
provided the control necessary while attemtping to create as realistic 
a setting as possible. 
The experimental simulation was operationalized through the use of 
a computerized business game, selected over a manual system for the 
computational speed and accuracy available in a computerized system. 
Also, use of a manual system might afford participants the opportunity 
to identify specifically the interrelationships of various game 
factors. As explicit identification of interrelationships in the 
operation of a business could not be examined from a written text, 
such an opportunity should not be available in this simulation. 
The KDSS Game 
Attempts made to select a game for use in this study suggested 
that a specialized game be constructed. Of interest in this examination 
was the issue of performance of individuals evaluated under two different 
PE methods. All of the canned programs examined provided a measure of 
net income. None of those games examined provided measures of production 
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efficiency, market effectiveness, and production maintenance as required 
for the multiple PE measure developed for this study. In addition, 
almost all of the games examined proved to be complicated enough to 
require several hours of thorough participant study before attempting 
to operate. 
As a result of the difficulties identified in the use of a marketed 
business game, the KDSS game was constructed. This game placed the 
participant in the position of divisional manager of the Tulsa Unit of 
Hansen Company. This division was identified as a part of the small 
electronic games industry (see Appendix B). 
Participants were required to make quarterly decisions on the level 
of expenditure for each __ of three areas. The first class of expenditures 
(El) consisted of those which impact upon production capacity. The 
second class consisted of expenditures (E2) which impact upon production 
efficiency while the third class (E3) impact upon market position. 
The expenditure levels available for each area and the resulting effects 
of various levels of expenditure in each of the three areas were 
described and graphically illustrated. 
The output provided by the game consisted of a quarterly income 
statement and four performance measures. The income statement consisted 
of sales, variable manufacturing costs, gross profit, quarterly 
expenditures made in each of the three areas and net income. Fixed 
costs were ignored and no inventory was considered. 
The four performance measures indicated consist of a productivity 
measure (PM), a market share measure (MSM), a profit measure (RORM), 
and a capacity maintenance measure (CMM). Each of these four measures 
was explained in detail and the expenditures which affect each measure 
were identified. 
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Also included in the game material is an example of operations of 
the fourth quarter for 19XO. This example is given as an indication of 
the quarterly output available for each participant as well as an 
indication of the position of the firm at the initiation of the experiment. 
Experimental Design 
Of interest in the four hypotheses are the four situations 
previously mentioned. Illustrated in Figure 2, Situation I is 
characterized by a long term manager orientation where the manager 
is evaluated on the basis of a single short term measure of profit-
ability (LRSM). Situation II consists of a long term manager orienta-
tion where the manager is evaluated on a multiple attribute measure 
(LRMM). Situations III and IV both assume short-run orientations with 
the manager evaluated on a single attribute of profitability (SRSM) 
and a multiple attribute measure (SRMM), respectively. Hypothesis I 
deals with differences between Situations I and II, Hypothesis II with 
differences between Situations III and IV, Hypothesis III with 
differences between Situations I and III and Hypothesis IV with 
differences between Situations II and IV. A completely randomized 
design was used for this study. This design allows for the relevant 
pairwise comparison of the results of the four situations. 
Subject Selection and Sample Size 
One hundred and twenty subjects were selected from the third, 



























Figure 2. Illustration of the Four Environmental Settings Used in 
This Study 
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State University. Selection was restricted to accounting majors with 
a GPA of 3.0 or above. 
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Much has been written about the use of students as surrogates for 
managers in a business decision environment (Dickhaut, Livingstone and 
Watson, 1972; Copeland, Francia and Strawser, 1973; Abdel-khalik, 1974). 
The two major criticisms center on students' lack of experience in 
actual business settings and the gaming behavior often exhibited by 
students in experimental studies. Gaming behavior entails acting in a 
manner which would not be found in an actual environment. 
The problem of lack of real world experience was to some degree 
offset by a knowledge of the business game and experience in its 
operation prior to the actual experimental session. The design of 
the experiment and an economically attractive reward structure were 
used to help limit gaming behavior. 
Each student was placed in one of 20 groups of six participants each. 
Five randomly selected groups constituting a sample of 30 students were 
placed in a long-run single measure (LRSM) environment described in 
Situation I. Similarly, other samples of 30 students each were 
placed in long-run multiple measure (LRMM), short-run single measure 
(SRSM) and short-run multiple measure (SRM11) environments described 
by Situations II, III, and IV respectively. No attempt was made to 
distinguish between the third, fourth and fifth year students. 
General business knowledge was assumed to be comparable among all 
students. Randomization of group assignment eliminated any significant 
bias that might have occurred. 
PE Measures Employed 
Two PE systems were used in the study. The first was simply a 
quarterly comparison of performance based on the quarterly rate of 
return on original investment (RORM). The second consisted of a 
composite score of activity with regard to productive efficiency, 
market effectiveness, profitability and productive maintenance. 
Activity during a quarter was reflected in scores for each of the four 
performance measures. These scores were then rated according to the 
scales constructed for that quarter and points were then assigned for 
each measure. The total points for all measures became the quarterly 
composite measure which served as the basis for comparison of 




Each participant received a periodic performance score (either net 
income or the calculated composite score). A run sheet (see Appendix C) 
was used to tabulate the quarterly score. Each individual was then 
assigned a position from 1 to 6 according to the relative value of 
their performance score. The highest score was assigned position 1, 
second highest position 2 and so on. Identical scores by two or more 
individuals resulted in multiple positions being assigned to each. For 
example, if players fll and 112 both scored 100, which is the top score 
in the group for the quarter, both players were assigned position 
1-2. 
For each period, 40 points worth $.10 each were allocated to 
participants within each group according to the schedule found in 
Table II. Position ties simply divided evenly the points assigned to 
both positions (e.g., position 1-2 assigned (19 + 10)/2 = 14.5 to each 
of the individuals involved). 
TABLE II 



















The point assignment for each quarter was then transferred from the 
run sheet to the group summary sheet (see Appendix C). This form 
provided a summary of the points earned by each participant over the 
course of the experiment. It also served as the basis from which 
monetary allocation of payoffs at the conclusion of the experiment 
were made. 
Experimental Process 
The following sections describe the process undertaken in 
operating the experiment. Details of the activity are described in 
the order in which they occurred. 
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Subject Enlistment and Introduction 
The first step in conducting this experiment consisted of enlisting 
the participation of qualified subjects. Contact was made with students 
in various upper level accounting classes as well as in various loca-
tions in the College of Business Administration building. These 
students were told that they were needed for an experiment examining 
managerial level performance which would take a total of 2-3 hours 
of time scheduled at their convenience over the next two weeks. They 
were informed that payment for their participation would be contingent 
upon their performance and would average $5-$8 with payoffs of $18-$20 
possible. Those indicating interest in participating were given the 
introduction and consent form. This form contained a brief written 
explanation of the purpose of the study and a consent form which each 
student participating in the experiment was asked to sign (see Appendix 
D). 
Trial Runs 
After collecting the consent forms, an instruction sheet and a 
trial run form (see Appendix E) in addition to a KDSS game packet was 
given to each student. The instruction sheet specified the time and 
place for turning in the trial run form and signing up for an experi-
mental session. This sheet as well as direct verbal communication 
instructed the participant to keep all work on a personal and 
individual basis. 
The participants -were instructed that the trial run forms were for 
them to experiment with the operation of the game. It was emphasized 
that there was no objective or goal that they should work towards in 
the decisions made for the trial run. The trial runs were simply 
available to aid their understanding of the mechanics of the game and 
to allow a pretest of the computer program for elimination or 
correction of any perceived deficiencies. Only one trial run of three 
quarters each was provided for each participant. 
Returned trail run forms were then batch processed in the evening 
and made available the following day. When the participants returned 
for the results of the trial runs, any questions they expressed 
concerning the mechanical operation of the game were answered. 
Session Sign-Up 
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Upon receiving the results of the trial run, each participant was 
asked to select (on a first come, first served basis) one of 20 two-hour 
periods in which to participate in the experiment. Each two-hour 
period was limited to six students. Prior to completion of the trial 
runs and sign-up of participants, each of the four environmental 
conditions was assigned in a random fashion to five of the 20 periods 
(see Appendix E). 
Experimental Session: Introduction 
After each group of six participants arrived for the experiment, 
a short review of the results of the two selected trial runs was 
conducted. Any specific questions as to the mechanical operation of 
the game were answered at this time. The purpose of this review as 
well as the trial runs was to minimize any first period(s) learning 
effects during the actual experiment. 
Next, each person was given a decision form and identified as a 
player (see Appendix G). A description of the environmental setting 
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under which the group was to operate was given to each participant (see 
Appendix H). For those environments with the multiple measure setting, 
Exhibit IV (see Appendix A) was also given and explained to each 
participant. After discussion on Exhibit IV concluded, the scales 
for each quarter to be used in the experiment were given to each of 
these participants (see Appendix A). It was specifically noted and 
pointed out that while the interval limits of the productivity measure 
(PM) and the capacity maintenance measure (CMM) remain constant over 
the course of the game, the interval limits of the market share measure 
(MSM) and the profit measure (RORM) shift each period. This shift 
required increased scores of these measures from each succeeding 
quarter's operations in order to even maintain the present cumulative 
point level achieved on that measure. 
At this point in the process, a distinction was made as to the 
groups which anticipated long-term job tenures and those which antici-
pated short-term job tenures. Those participants in the short-term 
settings were initially given only Part A of their environmental 
settings. Part A described a short-term position with promotion to 
another assignment expected in 3-5 quarters (see Appendix H). The short-
run multiple measure groups also received only the first five quarters 
of the scaling forms for calculation of their performance. Each short-
term group was explicitly told that they could only expect to be in 
their position for 3-5 quarters after which a superior would review their 
performance and make a decision on their subsequent assignment. Those 
participants in the long-term setting were told they would operate for 
10-12 quarters before any review would occur. 
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Finally, the point distribution (payoff) for quarterly performance 
was discussed and illustrated (refer to Table II, p. 67). Included in 
this explanation was a discussion and illustration of both the run 
sheet and the summary sheet as they would be used for the group. 
The group was then told to take as much time as they desired in 
individually studying the new material. The instruction of no communi-
cation between players was reemphasized. When each student was ready 
with their decisions for the first quarter, the actual operation of the 
game began. 
Experimental Session: Operation 
As each student presented quarterly decisions, the data were 
entered into the computer via a portable T. I. Silent 700 or DEC 10 
remote terminal. Printouts of the decisions results were returned 
immediately on the terminal used and given to the student. Results 
(performance scores) of the quarter's activity for the student were 
tabulated and listed on a run sheet and the student was then allowed 
to prepare for the next quarter's decisions. When all the results 
of one quarter were received, payoffs to each participant were 
accumulated on the summary sheet. 
At the end of the fourth quarter, those participants under the 
short-term settings received Part 2 of their performance measure 
which indicated that no advancement or movement of position was 
available. After reading the instructions and finding that they would 
continue in the same position under the same performance measure, 
these participants were instructed that the game would proceed for 
another 6-8 quarters. 
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At the end of a total of 10 quarters, all operations ceased. 
Participants of each group were assembled and thanked for their 
participation. The absolute necessity for silence with regard to their 
experience was discussed and all material relevant to the experiment 
was collected from each participant. Total remuneration due each 
person was summarized and dates for collection of the funds identified. 
Each group was then dismissed and told that results of the experiment 
would be available for examination two weeks after the final group was 
run. 
It should be noted that the initial discussion with each group 
involved 15-20 minutes. The first quarter's decisions were ready for 
processing approximately 5-10 minutes later. Total duration of the 
experiment varied from 1 1/4 to 1 1/2 hours with one group delayed 
slightly by computer difficulties. 
Summary 
This chapter examines the experimental design and methodology used 
in this study. An experimental simulation ·was employed to provide as 
much realism as possible while maintaining necessary control. One 
hundred and twenty third, fourth and fifth year students from the 
School of Accounting at Oklahoma State University with GPA's of 3.0 or 
above werearranged into 20 groups of six.participants each. The four 
environmental settings (LRSM, LR.'11M, SRSM, Sfu'1M) were each randomly 
assigned to five of the experimental groups. 
The chapter next discusses the payoff available for each participant. 
This remuneration was calculated quarterly using either a single PE 
system of profit or the multiple composite measure developed in this 




ANALY~IS OF RESULTS 
The experimental results of this study are discussed in this 
chapter. First, the behavioral activities of the participants are 
reviewed. No quantification or statistical methods are used for this 
behavioral analysis. Rather quantitative observations of behavior 
relating to the four experimental hypotheses are discussed. 
The second part of the analysis consists of a graphical representa-
tion of the quarterly expenditure decisions and resulting quarterly 
performance attribute scores of participants in each of the four 
environmental groups. A third portion of the analysis consists of a 
quantitative analysis of the performance of the participants in each 
environmental group with regard to the wealth of the firm at the 
tenninal point of the experiment. A vector of attribute performance 
scores is used to create a surrogate measure of the value of each of 
the 120 firms at the end of the experiment. The resulting performance 
of participants in each of the four environments is analysed using 
multivariate statistical analysis. 
Behavioral Analysis 
In the four experimental hypotheses there are two conditions which 
may vary. Hypotheses I and II hold anticipated job tenure constant and 
vary the type of PE system employed (single vs. multiple). Hypotheses 
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III and IV hold the type of PE system employed constant and vary the 
anticipated job tenure (short-run vs. long-run). Analysis of the 
behavioral effects of the various PE systems employed and anticipated 
job tenures used is of interest in this study. 
PE Systems Employed 
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The only behavioral effect that resulted from the use of a single 
vs. a multiple attribute PE system was the difference in time required 
to make the initial quarterly expenditure decisions. Those participants 
evaluated under the single measure of profitability made their initial 
sets of decisions in a matter of 3 to 4 minutes. Those participants 
evaluated under the multiple measures spend considerably more time 
(8-10 minutes) constructing their initial sets of decisions. 
This behavior lends credence to the premise that a multiple 
measure PE system will focus attention on more attributes than the 
one attribute which receives full focus under the single measure PE 
system. Participants under the single measure focused only on profit-
ability and required relatively little time to construct their decisions. 
Participants under the multiple measures had to focus attention on 
all four attributes (PM, MSM, RORM, CMM) and thus required additional 
time for decision making. 
Anticipated Job Tenure 
Two interesting behavioral activities resulted from the use of 
various anticipated job tenures. One activity concerned tenure and 
termination while the other concerned reorientation of individuals in 
the short term setting. 
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Tenure and Termination. Probably the most of ten asked question by 
the participants concerned the termination point of the experiment. 
Those participants in the long-run settings were told initially that 
they would operate for a total of 10-12 quarters. Concern was often 
expressed during the first few quarters of operation that early termi-
nation would occur. Towards the latter quarters (e.g, 8 and 9), probing 
by the participants was directed to identifying the particular quarter 
(10, 11, or 12) in which termination would occur. All inquiries 
received the response, "Termination of the experiment will be in quarter 
10, 11, or 12." 
For those operating under the short-run environments, initial 
instructions identified 3 to 5 quarters as the tenure of operation. 
This first part was terminated after period 4. The second part began 
with instructions of 6 to 8 additional operating quarters. This portion 
was terminated after 6 quarters, resulting in a total of 10· quarters of 
activity for those in the short-run settings. Probing as to the 
termination point in this setting was similar to that exhibited in the 
long-run settings. 
Another aspect in this area of interest is the behavior exhibited 
upon termination of the operations. In both the long-run and the two 
parts in the short-run settings, a time span of 3 quarters was given 
for termination. In the short-run settings, termination of Part A was 
in the second of three possible termination periods. For the long-run 
settings and Part B of the short-run settings, operations were halted 
in the first of the three possible termination periods. Discussions 
with the participants universally received the comment, "If I had only 
known we were going to stop this period, I would have really cut my 
expenses." This comment and the concern exhibited surrounding the 
terminal periods suggests that decisions made when termination is 
inuninent differ from those made when tenure is continuing. 
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Reorientation. One of the most interesting behavioral aspects of 
this experiment deals with the reaction of the participants in the 
short-run settings when they found that they would remain in the same 
position for an additional 6 to 8 quarters. Those participants under 
the single measure PE system seemed very perturbed and a little confused 
as to their subsequent decisions. The most frequent comment at this 
point was, "Great, what do I do now?'' 
In contrast, those participants operating under the multiple 
composite measure PE system seemed almost unconcerned about their 
continuation. The most frequent comment was, "Oh, okay", after which 
input for the subsequent period was .almost immediately available. 
The difference in these two reactions appeared to be due to the 
respective positions of the firms after the fourth quarter. Relative 
to the initial position of the firm, those operating under the SRSM 
environment had made decisions which resulted in a poorer market share, 
decreased productivity, and reduced capacity position. Past decisions 
had essentially milked the future position of the firm. Thus, when 
faced with continuing on with operations, participants had to pay the 
price for their past work. 
Those who operated under the SRMH environment made decisions in 
the first quarters that resulted in a position at the end of quarter 4 
which was much better with regard to market share, productivity, and 
capacity than the initial position of the firm. As hypothesized, the 
multiple composite measure focused attention on long range decisions 
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and thus stopped any milking that might occur. Participants faced with 
continued operation of their firm were not hurt at all by any short-run 
orientation of prior decisions. 
Graphical Analysis 
From the experiment conducted, information is available with regard 
to levels of expenditure made by each participant for each quarter. 
Data from operations such as average production efficiency, market share, 
compounded values, and production capacity for each of the 120 operating 
firms at the end of quarter 10 are also available. A discussion on 
each of these areas follows. 
Expenditure Levels 
The level of average expenditures for El, E2, and E3. for each of 
the four environmental settings (LRSM, LRMM, SRSM, SRMM) are illustrated 
in Figures 3 through 5. Of interest is the fact that the levels of 
expenditure in the multiple measure settings are, for all three expenses, 
higher than those under the single measure settings. 
Also of interest are the dips in expenditure level of those under 
the SRSM environment. Large drops are seen in fourth quarter expendi-
tures and decreases are seen again in quarter 10 levels. Much smaller 
decreases are seen under the SRMM. These drops do not appear under the 
long-run measures. This indicates that participants were sensitive to 
the terminal points, but that gaming with decisions at the end of the 
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Data from Operations 
In addition to the graphical analysis of the expenditures made by 
each of the four groups, graphical analysis of the quarterly performance 
results is also of interest. Four economic measures of performance 
have been selected as constituting a complete yet minimal set of 
attributes with regard to wealth maximization, i.e., measures of 
production efficiency (PM), market effectiveness (MSM), profitability 
(RORM), and productive maintenance (CMM). 1 An analysis of the average 
performance in each of these areas by each group follows. 
Figure 6 depicts the average PM performance for each of the four 
groups over the 10 operating quarters where performance is measured 
with respect to Quarter 4, 19XO (i.e., the base period). Average 
performance measured against the base period is found as the product 
of the PM score in quarter N with those of all prior periods, e.g., the 
base period PM for quarter 3 is the product of the scores for quarters 
1, 2, and 3. Obviously, the higher scores indicate increased productive 
efficiency. Of note is the fact that performances by the multiple 
measure groups are extremely similar and far superior to those of the 
single measure groups. 
Figure 7 depicts the average market share measure (MSM) for each 
environment over the 10 quarters. All groups start at 10 percent and 
drop initially due to the time delays built into the game. Of 
importance is the rise of the MSM's for the multiple measure groups. 
Note that the MSM raises to 13.6 percent and 11.7 percent for the two 
multiple measure groups while dropping to 9.9 percent and 6.5 percent 
for the single measure groups. 
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Figure 8 depicts the average quarterly profit achieved by each 
of the four groups. Note that over the short-run (first four periods), 
the single measure groups achieve more profit than do the multiple 
measure groups. However, beginning after the fifth period the 
performances of the multiple measure groups are superior. 
One further step can be made with respect to analyzing the average 
quarterly profit made by each of the four groups. Using the concept of 
the time value of money, the quarterly cash flows can be compounded 
to a single point in time and the resulting totals compared. Figure 9 
depicts the compounded values of each groups' average net income flow. 
Used in this process are compound rates from 8 percent to 24 percent. 
Note the superiority of the performances of the two multiple measure 
groups over the single measure groups. Also note that the compound 
rate used does not affect the comparative relationships within the 
range of rates depicted. This would indicate that the comp·arative 
analysis of the average profits earned by each of the four groups is 
the same for all individuals regardless of risk attitude. 
Figure 10 depicts the average capacity maintained by each of the 
four groups. Note that the two multiple measure systems maintained 
average capacity at 91 percent and 88 percent while average capacity of 
the single measure groups dropped to 78 percent and 52 percent. 
Statistical Analysis 
The wealth to the owner of a firm at any point of time is tradi-
tionally denoted as the compounded cash flow from past periods and 
the present value of all future periodic cash flow. In this experiment, 
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cash flows could be es~imated, but such an estimate would be arbitrary 
at best. In this study, the wealth or benefit to the owners from the 
operation of the firms consists of two major partitions: past cash 
flow (compounded· cash flow (CCF) to the end of quarter 10 at 16 percent) 
and three components reflecting the anticipated future cash flows. 
These three components are production efficiency (base period PM at 
quarter 10), market effectiveness (MSM at quarter 10) and productivity 
maintenance (CMM at quarter 10). 
An average wealth vector is constructed for each of the four 
environmental groups. Then a statistical analysis of pairwise equality 
using a multivariate Hotelling's T2 is conducted for each hypothesis. 
For those comparisons which result in a significance of 10 percent or 
less, a pairwise comparison of each of the four attributes using 90 
percent Bonferroni confidence intervals is conducted in order to gain 
some feel for the cause(s) of the differences. The intervals created 
contain the range of difference values between the attributes of 
interest. Therefore, if the interval for D versus E contains the value 
of zero then one must say that no difference in the two attributes is 
indicated. If the interval is on the lower (negative) side of zero, 
the value of D is less than E. If the interval is on the positive side 
of zero, the value of D is greater than E. 
Hypothesis I 
Hypothesis I is as follows: 
If a manager anticipates a long-run appointment, there will 
be no difference in the welfare of the owner resulting from 
the use of a PE system using the single attribute of short-
run profitability or a PE system using a composite of 
short-run and long-run attributes. 
A pairwise comparison of the LRSM and LRMM wealth vectors using 
Hotelling's r7 results in an overall significance level of 0.0001. 
This significance level suggests that the hypothesis that the LRSM 
and LRMM wealth vectors are equal may be rejected with a 99.99 percent 
probability of being correct. Analysis of the performance of the two 
groups on each of the four attributes results in the following 
confidence intervals. 
TABLE III 
CONFIDENCE INTERVALS - LRSM VS LRMM 
CCF: [-897 .0389221, +19 .37292212] 
PM: [-0.234377476, +o. 011429476) 
MSM: [-0.056548492, -0.018785508) 
CMM: [-0.228191191, -0.034208809]. 
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Since the intervals for PM and CCF contain zero, the performance of 
the LRSM and LRMM groups on these two measures are comparable. However, 
since the intervals for MSM and CMM are on the negative side of zero, 
performance for members of the LRMM group_s can be judged to be superior 
to performance of the LRSM groups on these two measures. 
With regard to Hypothesis I, the results of this experiment 
indicates that if a manager anticipates a long-run appointment, there 
is a difference in the welfare of the owner resulting from the use of 
a PE system with a single attribute of short-run profitability versus 
use of a PE system with a composite measure of short-run and long-run 
attributes. Specifically, the performances of the LRMM groups are 
superior to the performances of the LRSM groups with regard to market 
effectiveness (NSM) and productive maintenance (CMM). 
Hypothesis II 
Hypothesis II is stated as follows: 
If a manager anticipates a short term appointment, then the 
welfare of the owner will be greater if a multiple composite 
measure PE system consisting of both short and long term 
attributes are used than if a PE system using a single 
short-run profitability measure of performance is employed. 
A pairwise comparison of the SRSM and SRMM wealth vectors using 
Hotelling's T2 results in an overall significance level of 0.0001. 
Thus equality of the two measures may be rejected with 99.99 percent 
probability of being correct. Further pairwise analysis of the 
Bonferroni confidence interval for each attribute pair results in the 
following information. 
TABLE IV 
CONFIDENCE INTERVALS - SRSM VS SRMM 
CCF: [-860.8186828, -266.3146372] 
PM: [-0.472342347, -0.252840653] 
MSM: [ -0. 066009609, ·-o. 036923 73i] 
Ll1M: [-0.457807779, -0.271525621] 
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Since the intervals for all four measures are on the negative side 
of zero, performance of the SRMM groups is termed superior over all 
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attributes to performance by the SRSM groups. Thus, Hypothesis II 
cannot be rejected. The results of this study indicate that is a 
manager anticipates a short term appointment, then the welfare of the 
owner will be greater if a multiple composite measure PE system 
consisting of both short and long term attributes are used than if a 
PE system using a single short-run profitability measure of performance 
is employed. 
Hypothesis III 
Hypothesis III is stated as follows: 
If a PE system using a single short-run profitability measure 
of performance is used, the welfare of the owner will be 
greater if a long-run appointment is anticipated than if a 
short-run appointment is anticipated. 
A pairwise comparison of the LRSM and SRSM wealth vectors using 
Hotelling's T2 results in an overall significance level of 0.0001. 
This level of significance indicates that equality of the LRSM and 
SRSM wealth vectors may be rejected with 99.99 percent probability of 
being correct. Pairwise analysis of attribute performance results in 
the following confidence intervals. 
TABLE V 
CONFIDENCE INTERVALS - LRSM VS SRSM 
CCF: [141.5261973; 769.6071359] 
·PM: [0.111002627; 0.355430693] 
MSM: [0.020278223; 0.476551170] 
CMM: [0.llf2351908; 0.376448092] 
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Since the intervals for all four measures are on the positive side 
of zero, performance of the LRSM groups is termed superior over all 
attributes to performance by the SRSM groups. Thus, Hypothesis III 
cannot be rejected. The results of this study indicate that if a PE 
system using a single short-run profitability measure of performance is 
used, the welfare of the owner will be greater if a long-run appointment 
is anticipated than if a short-run appointment is anticipated. 
Hypothesis IV 
Hypothesis IV is stated as follows: 
If a PE system using a composite of short-run and long-run 
attributes is used, there will be no difference in the welfare 
of the owner resulting from anticipation of a long-run or a 
short-run appointment. 
A pairwise comparison of the LRMM and SRMM wealth vectors using 
Hotelling's T2 results in an overall significance level of 0.1599. 
Since this level of significance surpasses the adopted rejection range 
(90 percent), the hypothesis of the equality of the two vectors cannot 
be rejected. Thus, evidence in this experiment supports the hypothesis 
that a PE system using a composite of short-run and long-run attributes 
results in no difference in the welfare of the owner resulting from 
anticipation of a long-run or a short-run appointment. 
Summary 
The experimental results of this study are discussed in this 
chapter. Three types of analysis are employed: behavioral, graphical, 
and quantitative (statistical). 
Several behavioral activities relating to the four hypotheses 
are discussed. One activity related to the use of different PE systems 
is the time difference required to make decisions. Participants under 
the single measure PE system made periodic expenditure decisions very 
quickly. Those under the multiple measure PE system required much more 
time for their decisions. This behavior lends credence to the premise 
that a multiple measure PE tystem focuses attention on more attributes 
(and thus takes more time) than does the single measure PE system. 
When the type of PE system employed is held constant and the 
anticipated job tenure is varied, two interesting behavioral activities 
result. The first relates to the concern expressed by the participants 
in relation to the terminal points of their activities. This concern 
suggests that decisions made when termination is imminent differ from 
those made when tenure is continuing. 
The second activity deals with the reactions of participants in the 
short-run environments. In these environments, the initial operations 
were halted after the fourth quarter. Participants were then told the 
expected promotions were unavailable and that they would continue in 
their present positions for another 6-8 quarters. Because of the 
milking or short-run decisions made initially by those in the SRSM 
environment, the firms were not in a good position for continued opera-
tion. The participants in this environment seemed angry and confused 
at the prospects of continued operation. 
In contrast, those participants in the SRMM environment seemed 
almost unconcerned with the prospect of continued operations. This 
behavior supports the hypothesis that the multiple measure PE system 
focuses attention on long range decisions and stops any milking of the 
firm in a short-run tenure setting. 
Graphical analysis of the average quarterly expenditures is 
presented. Of interest is the fact that the levels of expenditures 
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in the multiple measure setting were, for all three expenses, higher 
than those under the single measure settings. Consequently graphical 
analysis of the four performance measures (PM, MSM, RORM, and CMM) 
indicates superior performance by the multiple measure groups over the 
period of operation. 
Quantitative analysis is done with regard to each of the four 
hypotheses stated in this experiment. An average wealth vector 
consisting of compounded cash flow (CCF), cumulative production 
efficiency at period 10 (PM), market effectiveness (MSM), and produc-
tivity maintenance (CMM) is constructed for each of the four environ-
mental groups (LRSM, LRMM, SRSM, SRMM). A Hotelling's T2 test is 
conducted for selected pairwise comparisons of the four groups. For 
those comparisons with a significant difference of 10 percent or less, 
a pairwise comparison of each of the four attributes using 90 percent 
Bonferroni confidence intervals is conducted in an attempt to identify 
the cause(s) of the differences. Results of this analysis are found 
in Table VI. 
TABLE VI 
ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
Overall Attributes Direction 
Group Significance Causing of 
Comparison Level Difference Preferance 
LRSM-LRMM 0.0001 MSM,CMM LRMM > LRSM 
SRSM-SRMM 0.0001 CCF ,PM,MSM, CMM SRMM > SRSM 
LRSM-SRSM 0.0001 CCF ,PM,MSM, CMM LRSM > SRSM 
LRMM-SRMM 0.1594 
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Thus, the experimental evidence suggests that use of the multiple 
measure PE system results in wealth to the o\..;rner which is superior to 
that from the use of the single measure PE system regardless of the 
anticipated job tenure duration. Also, on anticipated long-term 
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tenure results in superior wealth when compared with a short-term 
tenure under the single measure PE system. However, under the multiple 
measure PE system, no difference in owner's wealth due to anticipated 
job tenure is observed. 
CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a brief summary of the 
objective of this study. A sunrrnary of the background, theoretical 
development and methodology employed with regard to this objective is 
presented. This chapter also states the results of this examination 
and suggests possible areas for additional research. 
Summary 
The objective of this study is to examine the behavioral effects 
that result from managerial performance evaluation. Of specific 
interest is whether the measure(s) by which performance is evaluated 
and the duration of anticipated job tenure result(s) in different 
decisions (actions) by those being evaluated. This examination is 
limited to a divisional manager position in a profit making setting. 
Examination of prior research indicates almost exclusive use of 
short-run profit as the measure by which managerial performance has 
been evaluated. These studies also indicate that fixation of a single 
short-run profit objective often leads to dysfunctional behavior or 
behavior which is detrimental to the long-run succ.ess of the firm. 
As a reaction to the dysfunctional behavior resulting from the 
use of short-run profitability as a single PE measure, a few firms 
have attempted to employ multiple measure for PE which include both 
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short-run and long-run factors. The purpose of including long-run 
factors in the evaluation process is to focus attention on attributes 
which are essential for the long-run success of the firm. It is this 
issue of the use of a single versus a multiple "PE system when anticipated 
job tenure is short-term or long-term that this study addresses. 
Chapter III presents a theoretical framework for PE. Results of 
the development suggest that the purpose of PE with regard to the owner 
of the firm is to influence the manager to make decisions which will 
maximize the benefit (utility) of the owner. Maximization of wealth in 
the traditional economic sense of well-offness is presented as a 
suitable proxy for benefit (utility) maximization. 
The theoretical development suggests that in a single period 
environment, maximization of short-run profit is equivalent to 
maximization of wealth. When the analysis moves to a multiple period 
setting, short-run profit is found to be an incomplete measure of 
wealth because it fails to exact attention on long-run economic factors. 
As a result of this discussion, the following four hypotheses are 
suggested for testing in this study: 
Hypothesis I: If a manager anticipates a long-run appointment, 
there will be no difference in the welfare of the 
owner resulting from the use of a PE system using 
the single attribute of short-run profitability 
or a PE system using a composite of short-run and 
long-run attributes. 
Hypothesis II: If a manager anticipates a short term appointment, 
the welfare of the owner will be greater if a 
multiple composite measure PE system consisting of 
both short and long term attributes is used than 
if a PE system using a single profitaoility measure 
of performance is employed. 
Hypothesis III: If a PE system using a single short-run profit-
ability measure of performance is used, the 
welfare of the owner will be greater if a long-
run appointment is anticipated than if a short-
run appointment is anticipated. 
Hypothesis IV: If a PE system using a composite of short-run 
and long-run attributes is used, there will be 
no difference in the welfare of the owner 
resulting from anticipation of a long-run or 
a short-run appointment. 
Chapters IV, and V discuss the four basic activities necessary in 
establishing a multiple composite measure for use in PE. These 
activities consist of choosing the attributes to be included in the 
measure, scaling the attributes to transform physical levels of 
performance into measures of value or suitability, weighting the 
various attributes or allocating value to each attribute with regard 
to importance in the overall measure and determining a decision 
rule by which to combine the multiple measures into the composite 
measure. 
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Analysis and discussion in each of these four areas results in the 
multiple composite PE measure used in this study. This measure includes 
the attributes of production efficiency, market effectiveness, profit-
ability and productive maintenace. These attributes are scaled on an 
interval value level and weighted equally. The weighting summation 
model is employed to create the composite measure. 
Chapter VI reviews the methodology used in this study to examine 
the hypothesis of interest. An experimental simulation is employed in 
this study. This is facilitated through a computerized business game 
involving periodic decisions on three classes of expenditures: 
capacity maintenance; productive efficiency; and market effectiveness. 
One hundred and twenty subjects were randomly assigned to four 
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environmental settings: long-run tenure with short-run profit as the 
single PE measure; long-run tenure with the developed multiple composite 
PE measure; short-run tenure with short-run profit as the single PE 
measure; and short-run tenure with the developed multiple composite 
PE measure. 
Each individual in each environmental setting made quarterly 
expenditure decisions for a total of 10 quarters. Analysis then centers 
on whether differences in performance exist between individuals 
operating under the four environmental settings. 
Chapter VII presents an analysis of the experimental results. A 
wealth vector consisting of four attributes (discounted cash flow (CCF), 
production efficiency (PM), market effectiveness (MSM), and productivity 
maintenance (CMM)) is constructed for each of the four environmental 
groups (LRSM, LRMM, SRSM, SRMM). Pairwise comparisons of the various 
wealth vectors indicated by the four hypotheses is conducted using 
Hotelling's T2 Further analysis of significant overall difference is 
done using a 90 percent Bonferroni confidence intervals for each of 
the four attributes. 
Results of this analysis (summarized in Table VI, p. 95) indicate 
that a multiple composite PE system constructed of both short- and 
long-term factors is superior in all tenure settings to a single 
measure PE system based on short-run profit in maximizing the wealth 
of the firm. The results also indicate that if a single measure PE 
system based on short-,run profitability is used, performance when 
long-term tenure is anticipated is far superior to performance when 
short-run tenure is anticipated. When a multiple composite PE system 
constructed of both short- and long-term factors is used, anticipated 
job tenure has no significant affect on performance. 
Recommendations 
In the course of this study, several areas for future research 
have been suggested. Among these are the following: 
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1. Examination of these same issues in a not-for-profit situation 
or in a lower level managerial position. The issue of a 
single measure PE system (perhaps not of strict profitability 
but some other single focus) versus a multiple measure PE 
system as well as the effect of anticipated job tenure is of 
interest in more than just the case of a divisional manager 
in a profit making setting. 
2. Examination of the use of alternative reward structures. 
Perhaps reward tied directly to performance on individual 
attributes instead of ranking among peers would yield 
different results. Use of a nonlinear reward function or 
nonmonetary rewards exclusively could be examined. 
3. Examination of different economic settings. This study 
assumed only an expanding market. Similar analysis in a 
steady or contracting market might be of interest. 
4. Examination of the use of an alternative setting procedure, 
weighting technique and/or decision rule in constructing 
the multiple composite measure. 
5. Extension of the analysis in this study to an actual business 
setting using managerial individuals as subjects. 
Research in any or all of these areas might be of interest in examining 
the issue of performance evaluation. 
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MULTIPLE COMPOSITE MEASURE FORMS 
Exhibit IV is an example given to each of the participants in the 
multiple measure groups to explain the process of evaluating quarterly 
performance. The example is based on the activity of the fourth 
quarter of 19XO found in The KDSS Game in Appendix B. Exhibits I, II 
and III are found in the KDSS game. The other forms following 
Exhibit IV are used in the appropriate quarter throughout the operation 
of the game by those in the multiple measure groups. Note that the 









0.89 0.91 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.99 1.01 1. 03 1.05 1.07 1. 09 1.11 
I J___ I I _______ I I t I I I r----- -.- --- I r~ 
-1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 o.o +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +1.0 
o.oo 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20 
I I I I I I I I I ·1 I I 
-1. 0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +l. 0 
score -0.63 -0.40 -0.20 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.80 1.20 1.80 2.20 2.70 
RORH I I I I I 
points -1. 0 -0.8 ~0.6 -0.4 -0.2 o.o +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +l. 0 
~ 0.78 0.80 0.82 -0.84 -0. 86 -0.88 0.90 0.92 0.94 o. 96 0.98 1.00 
CMM I I I I 
points -1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +l. 0 
Scores for Example I, Quarter 4, Year 19XO Printout Score Points 
PM 1.000 o.o 
MSM 0.100 0.0 
RORM 1.000 0.4 





Quarter 1 Year Xl 
score 0.940 0.960 0.980 1.001 1.005 1.011 1.027 1.055 1.059 1.062 1.066 1.070 
PM I I I I I I I I I I I I 
points -1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +1.0 
score 0.089 0.091 0.093 0.095 0.097 0.099 0.101 0.103 0.105 0.107 0.109 0.110 
MSM I I I I I I I I I ·1 I I 
points -1. 0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 o.o +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +1. 0 
score -1.000 -0.750 -0.500 -0.250 0.000 0.500 0.850 1. 200 1. 500 2.000 2.500 3.000 
RORM I I I I I I f f I I I I 
points -1. 0 -o.s -0.6 -0.4 
score 0.010 0.050 0.150 0.250 
CMM 





-0.2 ·o.o +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +1. 0 
0.350 0.450 0.550 0.650 0.750 0.860 0.960 1.050 






Quarter 2 Year Xl 
score 0.940 0.960 0.980 1.001 1.005 1.011 1.027 1.055 1.059 1.062 1.066 1.070 
PM I I I I I I I I I I I I 
points -1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +1.0 
score 0.085 0.087 0.089 0.091 0.093 0.095 0.097 0.099 0.101 0.103 0.105 0.107 --
MSM I I I I I I I I I I I 1 
points -1. 0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 o.o +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +1. 0 
score -1.000 -0.500 0.000 0.200 0.400 0.700 1.000 1.350 1.700 2.100 2.500 3.000 
ROR.H I I I I I I I l I I I I 
points -1. 0 -0.8 ~0.6 -0.4 -0.2 o.o +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +1. 0 
score O.OJO 0.050 0.150 0.250 0.350 0.450 0.550 0.650 0.750 0.860 0.960 1.050 
CHM I L__ t I I _____ t_ _______ l ______ J ____ ____l_ L----~---~ I .-- r r----------, --- -----r- - -- ----- 1 1 - • 
















Quarter 3 Year Xl 
0.940 0.960 0.980 1.001 1.005 1.011 1.027 1. 055 1.059 1.062 1. 066 1.070 
I. I I I I I I I I I I I 
-1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 o.o +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +1.0 
0.070 0.075 0.080 0.083 0.086 0.089 0.092 0.095 0.098 0.101 0.104 0.107 
I I I I I I I I I ·1 I I 
-1. 0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 o.o +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +l. 0 
score 0.000 0~210 0.550 0.800 1.100 1.370 1.640 1.900 2.180 2.480 2.780 3.000 
ROfili I I I I I I I I I I I I 
points -1. 0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +l. 0 
score 0.000 0.050 0.150 0.250 0.350 0.450 0.550 0.650 0.750 0.860 0.960 1.050 
CMH ~------. f 1 I I I J _ _ ____ _J ________ L _______ l l ----,--- I I --, 










Quarter 4 Year Xl 
score 0.940 0.960 0.980 1.001 1.005 1.011 1.027 1.055 1.059 1.062 1.066 1.070 
PM 
_._ _____ .._ ____ ..._ _______ I_ _______ ~-------- I _________ I I I ___ J__ I I I------,--------,---- ----.--I I 
points -1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0. 4 -0.2 o.o +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +1.0 
score 0.050 0.060 0.070 0.075 0.080 0.085 0.090 0.095 0.100 0.105 0.110 0.115 
MSM I I I I I I I I I . I I I 
ooints -1. 0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 o.o +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +1. 0 
score -1.000 0.000 0.330 0.670 1.000 1.330 1.670 2.000 2.330 2.670 3.000 3.500 
RORM I I I I I I I I I I I I 
points -1. 0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 
score O.OJO 0.050 0.150 0.250 
CMM I I I 





-0.2 o.o +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +1. 0 
0.350 0.450 0.550 0.650 0.750 0.860 0.960 1.050 






Quarter 1 Year X2 
score 0.940 0.960 0.980 1.001 1.005 1.011 1.027 1.055 1.059 1.062 1.066 1.070 
PM ---- !__________ 1 _________ I I I 
l __ _l_______ I ! I ,---- - ---- -.-- --r:-------- I 
points -1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0. 4 -0.2 o.o +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +1.0 
score 0.040 0.055 0.070 0.080 0.090 0.095 0.100 0.105 0.110 0.115 0.120 0.125 
MSM I I I I I I I I I I I I 
-1. 0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 o.o +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +1. 0 
score -1.000 1.000 1.330 1.670 2.000 2.330 2.670 3.000 3.300 3.700 4.000 4.500 
RORH ---,- -- --. I I I I I -- --- - L J I I _________ t __________ l_ ___ ___j ...-----.,,-----.-----..------.-- I 
points -1. 0 ~o.s ~o.6 -o.4 -0.2 o.o +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +1. 0 
~ O.OJO 0.050 0.150 0.250 0.350 0.450 0.550 0.650 0.750 0.860 0.960 1.050 
CMM 










Quarter 2 Year X2 
score 0.940 0.960 0.980 1.001 1.005 1.011 1.027 1.055 1.059 1.062 1.066 1.070 
PM 
l _________ _t___ _____ I 
r--~- - r - -- , 
points -1.0 -0.8 
I 
-0.6 -0.4 
~----_..,__ ____ ...._ ______ L______ 1. I I I I - I -, ---
-0. 2 o.o +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +1.0 
score 0.030 0.040 0.050 0.060 0.070 0.080 0.090 0.100 0.110 0.120 0.130 0.140 -- I I I I I I I I I ·1 I I MSM 
Points -1. 0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +l. 0 
score -1.000 1.000 1.500 2.000 2.400 2.800 3.200 3.600 4.000 4.500 5.000 5.500 
RORM I I I I I I I I I I I I 
points -1. 0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 o.o +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +1. 0 
score 0.000 0.050 0.150 0.250 0.350 0.450 0.550 0.650 0.750 0.860 0.960 1.050 
CMM I I I I I I I I I I I I 










Quarter 3 Year X2 
score 0.940 0.960 0.980 1.001 1.005 1.011 1.027 1.055 1.059 1.062 1.066 1.070 
PM 
I ___ l ___ I I ____ ___J __ _______ I I 1 I I I 
I --~- .------.-:--·----r ---- -, 
points -1.0 -0.8 -0. 6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +1.0 
score 0.030 0.050 0.060 0.070 0.080 0.090 0.100 0.110 0.120 0.130 0.140 0.150 
MSM I I I I I I I I I . I I I 
points -1. 0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +l. 0 
score -1.000 2.000 2.500 3.000 3.500 4.000 4.500 5.000 5.500 6.000 6.750 8.000 
RORM -----r-- ----- --,-- - --- --, 
1 I I I _ _ ____ ._ _____ l _____ J ___ _ I I I _L ___ _j -----,--- - ---. 
points -1. 0 --0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 o.o +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +1. 0 
score O.OJO 0.050 0.150 0.250 0.350 0.450 0.550 0.650 0.750 0.860 0.9(0 1.050 
CMM 








0.0 +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +l. 0 




Quarter 4 Year X2 
score 0.940 0.960 0.980 1.001 1.005 1.011 1.027 1.055 1.059 1.062 1.066 1.070 
PM r- I I I I I I I I I I I 
points -1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +l.O 
score 0.020 0.035 0.060 0.085 0.100 0.110 0.120 0.130 0.140 0:150 0.160 0.170 
MSM 
points 
L_ __ __I ,-
-1. 0 
l_ _____ J_____ _ ____ l_____ _I I I I l -r-------,---------- l ____ T ______ _ 
-0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +l. 0 
score -1.000 1.000 1.800 2.600 3.400 4.200 5.000 5.800 6.600 7.400 8.200 9.000 
RORM T- I ----.----- -,- - f I I 
I I __ L______ I I _____ __ I___ L__ 1 
.---------- -1 
points -1. 0 ~o.8 ~o.6 -o.4 -0.2 o.o +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +l. 0 
score 0.000 0.050 0.150 0.250 0.350 0.450 0.550 0.650 0.750 0.860 0.960 1.050 
CMM r-------.-------.------.----------1 -------. -----------, I __ I _ ----- • ~I I ___ ______ l ______ J______ I I l ___ ____J I 











Quarter 1 Year X3 





. ._ ____ __,,_ ____ __. ___ ___1 ___ --- ·----- I I I I I I I - -. -- - -~----i~ 
-0.6 -0.4 -0.2 o.o +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +1.0 
score 0.000 0.020 0.040 0.065 0.090 0.105 0.120 0.132 0.147 0.160 0.175 0.190 
MSM I I I I I I I I I . I I I 
£Oints -1. 0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +l. 0 
score -1.000 2.000 3.000 4.000 5.000 6.000 7.000 8.000 9.000 10.000 11.000 12.000 
ROR11 I I I I I I I I I I 1 I 
points -1. 0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +1. 0 
score 0.000 0.050 0.150 0.250 0.350 0.450 0.550 0.650 0.750 0.860 0.960 1.050 
CMM 













Quarter 2 Year X3 









'- ----~----•--- I I l -------~1 I 1 I I t , -- ---~-,-----rr - r - -~-,
-1.0 -0.8 -o; 6 -0.4 -0.2 o.o +0.2 +o.4 +o.6 +o.8 +1.o 
0.000 0.020 0.040 0.060 0.080 0.100 0.115 0.130 0.150 0.190 0.190 0.210 
I I I I I I I I I ·1 I I 
-1. 0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +l. 0 
-1.000 1.000 2.500 4.000 5.500 7.000 8.250 9.500 10.750 12.000 13.500 15.000 
I I I I I I I I I I 
-1. 0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 +0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +l. 0 
score O.U)O 0.050 0.150 0.250 · 0.350 0.450 0.550 0.650 0.750 0.860 0.9EO 1.050 
CMM 














THE KDSS BUSINESS GAME 
The KDSS game was developed specifically for use in this study. 
This appendix provides information concerning the mechanical operation 
of the game. Three types of expenditures are developed and explained. 
Output of the game consists of a quarterly income statement and four 
performance measures. An example of the operation of quarter 4 of 
19XO is given. Also, an indication of the general effect of different 





The Hansen Company is part of the very competitive electronic 
games industry. The Tulsa Unit is assigned the production and develop-
ment of the hand held sports games. Due to restrictions beyond the 
firm's control, all the games from the Tulsa Unit sell for $20 each. 
Tulsa Unit's initial manufacturing cost is $10/unit. Prior to 
each quarter's production, deci~ions must be made with regard to 
three classes of expenditures. 
1. The first class of expenditures consists of those which impact 
upon production capacity. The quarterly expense on production 
capacity is denoted as El .and includes expenditures such as 
maintenance, capital budgeting, etc. 
2. The second class of expenditures consists of those which impact 
upon Eroduction efficiency. The quarterly expense on produc-
tion efficiency is denoted as E2 and includes such expenditures 
as Research and Development, employee training, etc. 
3. The third class of expenditures consists of those which impact 
upon market position. The quarterly expense on market position 
is denoted as E3 and includes such expenditures as advertising, 
public relations, quality control, etc. 
The dollar expenditures for each of the three classes (El, E2, and E3) 
will be subtracted from the gross profit in arriving at net profit. 
The effect of each of these expenditures on sales volume and/or 
manufacturing costs is described below. 
Due to the high demand for these games, the Tulsa Unit maintains 
no inventory. All units produced in a quarter are sold during that 
quarter. No unfinished work in process nor any finished goods remain 
on hand at the end of any quarter. 
A brief description of the variables from which you as the manager 
of the Tulsa Unit must make quarterly expense decisions follows. 
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Basic Business Setting 
Hansen's economic forecasters have reported that business volume 
is expected to increase by approximately 2% per quarter for the next 
four years. Initial sales volume is 25,000 units per quarter. Results 
for activity during the fourth quarter of 19XO are found in Exhibit I. 
Decision Variables 
Expense 1 
The Tulsa Unit has a practical production capacity of 100,000 units. 
With a production capacity expense, El, of $100,000 per quarter, 
practical capacity may be maintained. You, as manager of the Tulsa 
Unit must decide upon the level of El expense incurred. This expense 
ranges from $20,000 to $100,000 with increases in increments of $20,000. 
While the quarterly $100,000 expense will maintain capacity at $100,000 
units, smaller expenditures will cause a decrease in practical capacity. 
The effect of quarterly expenditures is felt in the quarter following 
the expense and is cumulative in nature. 
Expense 2 
Production efficiency expenditures, E2, range from $10,000 to 
$100,000 with increases in increments of $10,000. E2 affects the 
quantity of inputs which are used to manufacture the products which 
the Tulsa Unit sells. Initially, 100 input units at $.10 each are 
used to construct one finished output unit. An expenditure of 
approximately $40,000 will maintain the amount of inputs for each unit 
of output produced. A lower expenditure will raise the number of 
required inputs (and hence the cost per unit sold) while an expenditure 
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greater than $40,000 will--up to a certain level--decrease the amount 
of inputs per output unit produced (and hence the cost per unit sold). 
The general trend of the increase or decrease may be found in Exhibit II. 
The amount of the increase or decrease in input units may range from 
+5% to -7% per quarter. 
The effect of the quarterly E2 expense is felt the first quarter 
after expenditure. The quarterly effect is cumulative in nature over 
periods of operation. 
Expense 3 
The expenditure which impacts on market position, E3, ranges from 
$10,000 to $100,000 with increases in increments of $5,000. An 
expenditure greater than $30,000 will increase quarterly sales volume 
while an expenditure less than $30,000 will result in a decrease of 
quarterly sales volume. The general increase or decrease in sales 
volume that results from various levels of expenditure can be seen in 
Exhibit III. The amount of the increase or decrease in volume ranges 
from a possible +17% to -5% per quarter. 
E3's effect on sales is not felt in the quarter of expenditure. 
Partial effect is felt in the first quarter after the expenditure while 
full effect is felt beginning in the second quarter after the expendi-
ture. The effect of the quarterly E3 expense on sales volume is 
cumulative in nature. 
Program Output 
For each quarter, you will receive an output similar to Exhibit I. 




PM is the productivity measure and is defined as the percent 
savings due to a change in productivity. The measure is calculated 
as follows: 
or 
where 11 Unit:s of intput in quarter t-1, 
12 unit:s of input in quarter t, 
xl = units of output in quarter t-1, and 
x2 units of out.put in quarter t. 
The units of input: used in calculating this measure are directly 
affected by the amount of quarterly production efficiency expense (E2). 
MSM 
MSM is the market share measure and is calculated as quarterly 
sales of Tulsa Unit divided by quarterly sales of the market. Initially, 
Tulsa Unit maintains 10% of the market. MSM is calculated as follows: 
Tulsa Unit sales in quarter i 
Market sales in quarter i 
Total market sales increase approximately $500,000 per quarter. 
Quarterly sales volume is directly affected by the level of market 
position expense (E3). Sales volume may also be affected by production 
capacity expense (E2). 
126 
RORM 
The Rate of Returm on Investment measure (RORM) is calculated as 
follows: 
Net income in quarter if Investment 
Cost of capital 
or 
Net income in quarter i 
$80,000 
The investment for the Tulsa Unit is $800,000. Hansen Company has 
calculated that the cost of capital for the firm is 10%. RORM is 
directly affected by the level of El, E2, and E3 expense. 
CMM 
CMM is the Capacity Maintenance measure. CMM is defined as actual 
quarterly capacity/practical capacity. Tulsa Unit has a new plant 
facility with a practical production capacity of 100,000 units. The 
quarterly capacity level is directly affected by the level of quarterly 
El expense selected. 
Exhibit I 
Income Statement and Performance Measures 
For Quarter 4, 19XO 
(all numbers in thousands) 
Player Ill 
Sales 
Variable Manufacturing Costs 
Gross Profit 
Expenses 
Expense Class 1 
Expense Class 2 







PM = 1. 000 MSM 0.100 RORM 1.000 CMM 
Exhibit II 
1.000 
General Effect of Quarterly E2 Expense Levels on 














Expense Effect on 
Input Units 
Oi--~_._~~_.,_~~~~--,-1~~~~ 









General Effect of Quarterly E3 Expense 







El--Capacity E3--Sales Volume 
Level Expense Level Expense 
1 $ 20,000 1 $ 10,000 
2 40,000 2 15,000 
3 60,000 3 20,000 
4 80,000 4 25,000 
5 100,000 5 30,000 
6 35,000 
E2--Production Efficiency 7 40,000 
Level Expense 8 45,000 
1 $ 10,000 9 50,000 
2 20,000 10 55,000 
3 30,000 11 60,000 
4 40,000 12 65,000 
5 50,000 13 70,000 
6 60,000 14 75,000 
7 70,000 15 80,000 
8 80,000 16 85,000 
9 90,000 17 90,000 
10 100, 000 18 95,000 
19 100,000 
APPENDIX C 
RUN AND SUNMARY SHEETS 
A run sheet is used each quarter to tabulate the quarterly perform-
ance score for each group participant. Once scores are tabulated, 
position assignment is made and reward points are assigned. 
The group summary sheet provides a summary of the points earned 
by each participant over the course of the experiment. This sheet also 




Group ff ----- Date ----- Time Setting --~-~ 
Score Position Points 
Player Ill· 







Group fl --- Date ----- Time Setting 
Name Phone fl 
Pla er /fl 
Pla er !f 2 
Pla er ff 3 
Pla er 114 
Pla er 115 
Player #6 
Points Per Player Per Run 
~11 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 . 12 13 
Player ill 
Player f/2 
Player fl 3 
Player f/4 




INTRODUCTION AND CONSENT FORM 
This form is given to each student indicating interest in 
participating in the study. It contains a brief written explanation 




Introduction and Consent Form 
This study is undertaken to examine managerial performance. The 
KDSS game will be used in which you will be required to make decisions 
on three expense variables over a number of quarters. The type of 
industry, environment, and performance measure will be specified at 
the beginning of the activity. Participants will be placed into groups 
of six individuals. Monetary payments will be based on individual 
performance as evaluated by the performance measure specified. The 
amounts of these payments range from approximately $1 to $20. 
Informed Consent by Subjects in Experiments 
I, 
-~~~~~--~~--~~-~~-~~-
, have carefully read and 
Print Name 
fully understand the instructions for this experiment on Managerial 
---~---
Performance • I give my consent to serve as a subject in this 
requirement on I am aware that I may ask 
(Date) 
questions or terminate the experiment at any point. I am also aware 
that discussing my activity in this expe~iment with any other persons 
will result in my removal as a participant without any payment. 
Signature 
APPENDIX E 
INSTRUCTION SHEET AND TRIAL RUN FORM 
The instruction sheet specifies the time and place for turning 
in the trial run form and signing up for an experimental session. 
The trial run form simply provides a form for making expenditure 
decisions for three sequential quarters. 
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Introduction 
The following is a description of the KDSS game, the quarterly 
decisions that must be made, and the results of the decisions made in 
the last quarter of 19XO. Please study this material carefully. 
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A period of time will be given for you to read this material and 
make a set of trial decisions for the quarters. These decisions may be 
turned in to Bus. 433-E on February 11-16 from 8 am to 5 pm. Results 
of the trial run will be available beginning the day after they are 
turned in. Sign up sheets for the experiment are in Bus. 433-E. The 
experiment will be run from February 16 through February 27. 
Please place yourself in the position of a manager and approach 
this study in a serious and nontrivial manner. For experimental 
reasons, we must insist that you not discuss your involvement in this 
experiment with any.other individual until after the experiment has 
been totally finished. Those found discussing their participation 





Level of Ex.J2ense _ 
Run Ouarter Year Player If El E2 _E2__ 
00 4 XO 1 5 4 5 
01 1 Xl 1 
02 2 Xl 1 
03 3 Xl 1 
Turn this in to Bus. 433-E on February 11-16 between the hours of 
8 am to 5 pm. Results of your trial run will be available the next day. 
APPENDIX F 
EXPERIHENTAL SESSION DATES AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSIGNMENTS 
This appendix simply lists the dates and times of the 20 experi-
mental sessions. The setting is assigned to each session is done so 
in a random manner. 
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Group II Date Time setting 
1 Tuesday February 17 3 pm - 5 pm LRSM 
2 Tuesday February 17 6 pm - 8 pm LRMM 
3 Tuesday February 17 8 pm - 10 pm LRMM 
4 Wednesday February 18 3 pm - 5 pm LRSM 
5 Thursday February 19 3 pm - 5 pm LRMM 
6 Friday February 20 3 pm - 5 pm LRSM 
7 Saturday February 21 10 am - 12 noon LRSM 
8 Saturday February 21 2 pm - 4 pm SRMM 
9 Monday February 23 6 pm - 8 pm SRMM 
10 Monday February 23 8 pm - 10 pm SRMM 
11 Tuesday February 24 3 pm - 5 pm SRSM 
12 Tuesday February 24 3 pm - 5 pm SRSM 
13 Tuesday February 24 6 pm - 8 pm SRSM 
14 Tuesday February 24 6 pm - 8 pm LRSM 
15 Tuesday February 24 8 pm - 10 pm LRHM 
16 Wednesday February 25 3 pm - 5 pm LRMM 
17 Wednesday February 25 8 pm - 10 pm SRMM 
18 Thursday February 26 3 pm - 5 pm SRSM 
19 Thursday February 26 3:30 pm - 5:30 pm SRSM 
20 Friday February 27 12 noon - 2 pm SRMM 
APPENDIX G 
EXPERIMENTAL DECISION FORMS 
The form in this appendix is used by the participants in each 




* 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6--one for each member of the group. 
APPENDIX H 
ENVIRONMENTAL SETTINGS 




Environment and Performance Measure 
LRSM 
Hansen Company has an opening for the manager of its Tulsa Unit. 
You have been interviewed by Mr. Hansen and have taken the job. You 
accept the position with the knowledge that your performance will be 
closely watched. This is a position you have worked for years to 
obtain. You now fully expect that a good performance record will keep 
you in this position for many years to come. In fact, due to your age 
and the organization of the company, you expect to remain in this 
position until your retirement in eight years unless you are fired. 
As no alternative position within or without the firm is available, 
to be fired would simply be a total loss of employment. 
Mr. Hansen reminds you that the future of the Tulsa Unit is affected 
by your decisions. He trusts your ability and indicates that your 
performance will be evaluated quarterly, along with the performance 
of Hansen Company's other unit managers. Maintaining satisfactory 
evaluations is the key to remaining in this position. After 2-3 years, 
Mr. Hansen will drop by to assure himself that your performance has 
been satisfactory. This evaluation as well as the quarterly evaluations 
will be based solely on the amount of profit achieved. 
Environment and Performance Measure 
LRMM 
Hansen Company has an opening for the manager of its Tulsa Unit. 
You have been interviewed by Mr. Hansen and have taken the job. You 
accept the position with the knowledge that your performance will be 
closely watched. This is a position you have worked for years to 
obtain. You now fully expect that a good performance record will keep 
you in this position for many years to come. In fact, due to your age 
and· the organization of the company, you expect to remain in this 
position until your retirement in eight years unless you are fired. 
As no alternative position within or without the firm is available, 
to be fired would simply be a total loss of employment. 
Mr. Hansen reminds you that the future of the Tulsa Unit is 
affected by your decisions. He trusts your ability and indicates that 
your performance will be avaluated quarterly, along with the performance 
of Hansen Company's other unit managers. Maintaining satisfactory 
evaluations is the key to remaining in this position. After 2-3 years 
Mr •. Hansen will drop by to assure himself that your performance has 
been satisfactory. This evaluation as well as the quarterly evaluations 
will be based on the following areas: 
25% Productivity 
25% Market Position 
25% - Profitability 
25% Capacity 
Prior to each period,. you will be given information regarding the point 
scale for each of the four performance measures (see Exhibit IV for an 
example). Your scores for each of the four measures will be taken from 
the computer printout and your points totaled. Payment will be based on 
your comparative point standing. 
Environment and Performance Measure 
SRSM Part A 
Hansen Company has an opening for the manager of iU; Tulsa Unit. 
You have been interviewed by Mr. Hansen and have taken the job. You 
recognize that t:his is another step in your upward movement with 
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Hansen Company. Your performance in this position will be a major 
factor in your career development. You will be evaluated on a quarterly 
basis along wit:b. the managers of Hansen Company's other units. It is 
understood that a good performance evaluation will lead to another 
quick promotion as well as a large increase in pay. 
Mr. Hansen reminds you that the future of the Tulsa Unit is 
affected by your decisions. He trusts your ability and indicates that 
your next promotion may be possible within 3-5 quarters. Maintaining 
high quarterly evaluations is the key to obtaining the promotion. 
Quarterly evaluat:ions will be based solely on the amount of profit 
accumulated. Quite obviously, the higher the quarterly profit, the 
more favorable the evaluation. 
1L+6 
Environment and Performance Measure 
SRSM P<Jrt B 
You have done very well in your first four quarters with the Tulsa 
Unit. Mr. Hansen congratulates you on your work and announces a 
$5,000 raise. Regretfully, there is not a higher management position 
open at this point in time. However, in another 6-8 quarters a 
position will open up to which you may be elevated. For the interim. 
Mr. Hansen requests that you continue to operate the Tulsa Unit with 
the same success that you have experienced. Another evaluation will be 
made at the time the future position is available to assure the 
company of your ability. This evaluation as well as each interim 
quarterly evaluation will be based on the same set of variables as 
your previous evaluations. 
• 
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Environment and Performance Measure 
SRMM Part A 
Hansen Company has an opening for the manager of its Tulsa Unit. 
You have been interviewed by Mr. Hansen and have taken the job. You 
recognize that this is another atep in your upward movement with 
Hansen Company. Your performance in this position will be a major 
factor in your career development. You will be evaluated on a quarterly 
basis along with the managers of Hansen Company's other units. It is 
understood that a good performance evaluation will lead to another 
quick promotion as well as a large increase in pay. 
Mr. Hansen reminds you that the future of the Tulsa Unit is 
affected by your decisions. He trusts your ability and indicates that 
your next promotion may be possible within 3-5 quarters. Maintaining 
high quarterly evaluations is the key to obtaining the promotion. 
Quarterly evaluations will be based on the following areas: 
25% - Productivity 
25% - Market Position 
25% - Profitability 
25% - Capacity 
Prior to each period, you will be given information regarding the point 
scale for each of·· the four performance measures (see Exhibit IV for an 
example). Your scores for each of the four measures will be taken from 
the computer pointout and your points totaled. Payment will be based 
on your comparative point standing. 
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Environment and Performance Measure 
SR.MM Part B 
You have done very well in your first four quarters with the Tulsa 
Unit. Mr. Hansen congratut'1tes you on your work and announces a 
$5,000 raise. Regretfully, there is not a higher management position 
open at this point in tine. However, in another 6-8 quarters a 
position -will open up to which you m.:iy be elevated. For the interim, 
Mr. Hansen requests that you continue to operate the Tulsa Unit with the 
same success that you h::ive experienced. Another evaluation will be m~1de 
at the time the future position i.s available to assure the company of 
your ability. Thls evaluation as well as each interim quarterly 
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